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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This thesis is about two historians and two cultures – the Byzantine historian Theophanes the 
Confessor who lived between 760-818, and the Islamic historian al-Ṭabarī who lived between 
749-833. My thesis is a work of comparative history, a study of the chronicles of the two 
ancient writers. 
Through the works of Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī this thesis will examine how the rulers they 
describe exercised power. What kind of power was possible and necessary in the two 
cultures? Were they the same, or different – and in which ways? 
As we shall see, the two chronicles are very different in both length and in how their writers 
view the world. Still, both works contain detailed descriptions and evaluations of the 
personalities and actions of the various rulers, which makes it possible to compare the 
descriptions. 
While modern historians have conducted extensive work in the fields of Byzantine and 
Islamic history, and a good deal of effort has been spent on researching medieval Byzantine 
and Islamic historians, few comparative studies exist. This may seem strange, as the two 
cultures shared a common background and were closely intertwined.1 The historiographical 
situation probably reflects the compartmentalization that traditionally has existed in academia: 
Antiquity and its extension into the Byzantine world, has been seen as something separate 
from the study of the Islamic world.2 The histories of both civilizations are after all closely 
interwoven after the spread of Islam from the 7th century onwards, till the fall of 
Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks in 1453. One could argue that the two civilizations have 
an even longer common history, as the Romans and Arabs interacted long before the spread of 
Islam.3 In the period under study here, they certainly were in close contact. 
I have chosen to focus on the rulers in the eight and in the early ninth century. One reason is 
that a lot has been written on Byzantine history in the tenth to eleventh centuries, less on the 
eighth century. It thus seemed more worthwhile to explore this period of Byzantine history. 
The situation is not the same in Islamic historiography, the eighth century was the period of 
the famous ‘Abbasid caliphs, and a lot has been written on this period in Islamic history. Still,  
there is little comparative work to be found, and this makes it interesting in that perspective. 
 
1 See Donner 1998 and Jokisch 2008 
2 Donner 1998: pp. 293-296 
3 Shahîd 2006: pp. 11-13 






This especially so since both the Byzantine empire and the Islamic caliphate went through 
great changes in this century. The chronicles and the time period are thus worth exploring. 
No matter how many difficulties one might point out when it comes to using Theophanes and 
al-Ṭabarī, the fact remains that these chronicles are among our most important sources for the 
period.4 Without them, we would simply not know much about life in the Byzantine and 
Islamic worlds in the eighth century.  
I am looking for the descriptions of the human beings that held power. And to the degree the 
historians reflect the attitudes and expectations of their time, what did their respective 
societies look for in a ruler? 
Both works are literary texts – they contain a lot of different information on many different 
topics. In spite of different lengths, they have much in common in the sense of structure and 
approach, enough so that they can be used for a comparative study. 
Finally, there is simply the human aspect of these works. Both Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī are 
historians that manage to write across the centuries. The events are interesting enough, but the 
descriptions of human behavior – their actions, sayings, and faiths – are captivating to a 
modern reader, and so worth investigating. 
In working with this thesis, two thinkers on the theory of history have been especially useful 
and inspiring. The first is the cultural historian Quentin Skinner. He argues that when we 
study history, we have to assume that it is possible to relate to the people of the past, even 
though the past is often a strange landscape. No matter how difficult it may be to understand 
the beliefs of the people we study, we must assume some “convention of truthfulness” in 
whatever texts and other utterances they have left behind.5 This approach seems sensible and 
necessary to me, and this is what I do when reading the texts of Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī. 
The second theorist I have made much use of, is the historical sociologist Michael Mann. His 
theory of the “four sources of social power”, and his model of how societies are “constituted 
of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power.” are used 
extensively in the following pages.6 
 
4 Mango and Scott 1997: Introduction, p. v, and Kennedy 2006: Foreword, pp. xx-xxi 
5 Skinner 2002: p. 40 
6 Mann 2005: pp. 1-2 






Chapter 2 Background 
2.1 Research question 
This thesis tries to answer the following: What is portrayed as crucial for being a ruler with 
power in the historical chronicles of Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī? What made these rulers 
powerful – or weak – in the eyes of the two historians? Are there similarities in what the two 
writers describe? Are there differences? What can this tell us about the two cultures?  
As I stated above, there has not been much comparative research done on Byzantine and 
Islamic history. This thesis compares the works of two of the most famous ancient historians 
from each culture. The analysis brings new perspectives on their chronicles, and it shows how 
Mann’s theory is a useful tool in the sorting and categorization of a vast amount of source 
material. 
 
2.2 Earlier research 
2.2.1 Modern views on Byzantine historiography 7 
Let us first look at the writing of history in the Byzantine world, and how modern historians 
view this activity. The Byzantine historians inherited a tradition that went back to the classical 
world. It formed an important background for more than a millennium of Byzantine historical 
writing.8 
For my purposes it is important to keep in mind that Theophanes wrote at the beginning of the 
ninth century. He thus predates the great flowering of Byzantine historiographical writing of 
the eleventh century. I will therefore not say anything about the historians of this later period. 
Neville argues that since the early modern period and well up into the twentieth century, 
scholars have mostly been interested in recovering the biographies of the Byzantine 
individuals who wrote the various histories of their time, and in reconstructing texts that no 
longer exists on the basis of those manuscripts that do survive. This changed in the late 
twentieth century, when intellectual currents changed and the so-called ‘the linguistic turn’ 
led to a shift in focus from the reconstruction of individuals to analyzing texts.9 
 
7 Partly based on Frognes 2018, pp. 5-7 
8 Angold and Whitby 2008: p. 838 
9 Neville 2018: p. 1 






There were mainly two types of histories in Byzantine historiography, “chronicles” and 
“classicizing histories”.10 Both of these had ancient roots and in their Byzantine form they 
existed in the same official milieu.11 
Earlier Byzantinists have regarded the two genres as separate and with different cultural 
values. The histories were considered good, the chronicles were not. This categorization can 
partly be attributed to the nature of the texts, but also to prejudices about medieval writing. 
According to Neville, these biases that have mostly been abandoned by modern scholars. At 
the same time, there are good reasons for keeping the distinction between histories and 
chronicles. There are characteristics of style that make it reasonable to characterize a 
historical text as belonging to one or the other type of genre.12 
Angold and Whitby argues that classicizing histories were substantial productions and use 
Prokopios and Ammianus as examples.13 Classicizing histories have some common 
characteristics. Often, they opened with an introduction, where the authors truthfulness is 
proclaimed. In addition, the authors stated that they were going to write the truth without 
favoritism. The writers were all from the Byzantine elite, and had a thorough knowledge of 
classical literature, philosophy, and history.14 A chief characteristic was the use of classical 
Attic Greek. The Byzantine historians emulated the language of ancient Athens, even though 
this was different from their own everyday spoken language. Classicizing histories deal with 
relatively short periods of time, either about a particular reign or a chronologically narrow 
series of events. The usual topics were politics and war. They were usually contemporary, or 
near contemporary histories from the authors’ own lifetimes. In this, they were part of a long 
tradition.15 Another characteristic was that often one author would pick the narrative thread 
were a previous historian had stopped. In this way several different histories could make a 
continuous narrative together.16 We shall see that Theophanes’ text fits with some of these 
characteristics, even though his work is mainly seen as a chronicle.  
The chronicles were characterized by some common features, which separated them from the 
classicizing histories. They used a simpler style of Greek. The grammar of the chronicles was 
 
10 Neville 2018: 8 
11 Angold and Whitby 2008: p. 840 
12 Neville 2018: pp. 8-9 
13 Angold and Whitby 2008: p. 839 
14 Neville 2018: 7 
15 Neville 2018: 11 
16 Neville 2018: 11-12 






not like the spoken language of the time, but more like the koine Greek of the New Testament. 
The use of less-classicizing Greek has been seen as evidence of a lack of education, but it 
could just as well have been a deliberate choice by the authors: to write in a lower registry 
could make the text clearer, it could signal humility and Christian virtue, and it would fit the 
style of the genre.17 Another characteristic of the chronicles is that they deal with larger time 
spans than the classicizing histories do. Often, they start with the creation of the world, and 
end in the time of the author.18 Chronicles also continued a tradition from the classical world, 
with collections of brief historical information, along with lists of annual magistrates or 
priests.19  
As for who the audience of the Greek writers were, this is uncertain, but a fair assumption is 
that they belonged to the upper class in Byzantine society.20 Neville argues that the chronicles 
have a format, both in the sense of composition and type of language, that makes them well 
suited to oral performances and so a wider audience. At the same time the classicizing 
histories may also have been read aloud, even though the audiences in all probability were 
smaller, aristocratic milieus.21 
2.2.2 Modern views on Islamic historiography 22 
We now move on to the writing of history in the Islamic world. Whereas Byzantine historians 
could emulate their Greek forbears in both form and content, the situation was different for 
the Islamic writers. Around 700, Islamic historiography was in its beginnings. It was still in 
the service of Muslim religion and law, but it “absorbed Byzantine and, perhaps, Iranian 
influences and strove, with partial success, quickly to become a worldly political and 
educational subject.”23 Jokisch discusses this at length and points out that the question of 
which traditions the Islamic historians drew on is a controversial subject.24 He argues that a 
cultural a transmission took place in Baghdad during the ninth to tenth centuries, where the 
Islamic world absorbed the classical heritage from the Graeco-Roman world, but also 
impulses from the contemporary Byzantine world. The cultural melting pot that was Baghdad 
 
17 Neville 2018: 13 
18 Neville 2018: 13 
19 Angold and Whitby 2008: p. 840 
20 Angold and Whitby 2008: 844 
21 Neville 2018: 17 
22 Partly based on Frognes 2018, pp. 7-8 
23 Rosenthal 1968: p. 194 
24 See Jokisch 2007 for a lengthy discussion on this question 






in the eight to tenth centuries also included elements of Persian and Jewish cultures. In 
addition, there seem to have been influences from India and China as well. 
The Arabic term for history, taʼrīkh (history, i.e. verbal representation of events) appears in 
the Arabic sources for the first time at the end of the eighth century. The etymology of the 
term taʼrīkh is uncertain, but the similarity with the Greek term for Dating or alternatively, 
History, makes it fairly certain that the meaning of the Arabic term comes from Greek. This 
coincides with the emerging Islamic humanism and the systematic translation and exploration 
of Greek works in the Islamic world. However, it is mostly the structure of the genre and 
reports concerning non-Islamic history that are similar to Greek.25 Rosenthal, in his work on 
Islamic historiography, states that the origins of Islamic historiographic writing are “shrouded 
in darkness”. As the emerging Islamic society developed politically and culturally, this 
situation changed, as we have seen above. Rosenthal identifies three large groups of historical 
works as particularly important after the obscure, initial phase of historical writing. They are 
World histories, local or regional histories, and contemporary histories and memoirs.26 Al-
Ṭabarī combined all of these in his History. 
In Muslim education, the writing of history was not a discipline that held an important place. 
It did not often enable its practitioners to earn a living as historians, who usually earned their 
keep as philologists and genealogists. Al-Ṭabarī was more famous as a theologian to his 
contemporaries than as a historian.27 
Even though both Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī’s works are defined as chronicles, they defy the 
standard definition given above. The works contain much more than simple summaries of 
each year described, they contain narratives that allow for a much richer understanding and 
interpretation of the historians’ worlds. Particularly al-Ṭabarī writes in detail about the 
personalities of the various caliphs and other historical persons. Even Theophanes’ often terse 
give the reader insight into the psychology of the actors in the historical scenes he describes. 
My analysis of power is made possible because Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī give these detailed 
descriptions – descriptions that allow for an understanding of not only the actions but also the 
 
25 Jokisch 2007: pp. 433-434 
26 Rosenthal 1968: 129 
27 Rosenthal 1969: 54 






thoughts of the various rulers. The limited horizon of the typical chronicle is thus transcended. 
That makes our historians so interesting and valuable to study. 
 
2.3 Sources 
2.3.1 The life of Theophanes the Confessor 
There are two principal sources for the life of Theophanes. The first is a panegyric by St 
Theodore the Studite. It was probably delivered in 822, when Theophanes' body was deposed 
in his monastery. The second source is a description of Theophanes’ life, written before 832 
by Methodios, the future patriarch of Constantinople (843-847). Other biographical material 
on Theophanes exists but is not considered to have much independent value.28 
These two sources are not completely consistent in how they portray Theophanes, but the 
following is a summary of the most important facts that can be collated from them. 
Theophanes was born in Constantinople, probably in 760 or late in 759.29 His parents were 
high-ranking members of the Byzantine society: his father served in the upper echelons of the 
military in the time of emperor Constantine V. Theophanes’ father died early, and the 
emperor himself became the young Theophanes’ guardian.30 Theophanes in described as 
easygoing and a good host, he is represented as a grand seigneur, addicted to sports in his 
youth, handsome and somewhat overweight. Theophanes briefly married, but both he and his 
wife soon embraced the vocations of monastic life. Theophanes founded his own monastery, 
Megas Agros on the southern shore of the Sea of Marmara. As the monastery’s abbot, he 
participated in the Second Council of Nicaea in 787. This is one of the episodes from his 
chronicle that will be analyzed below, and it interesting to note that he experienced this 
important event himself. The council restored the veneration of icons, and from Theophanes’ 
text it is obvious that he supported this theological position. The emperor Leo V (813-820) 
revived iconoclasm, and as a supporter for the veneration of icons, Theophanes was jailed and 
exiled to the island of Samothrace. He died there in 818. It is the persecution Theophanes 
suffered as an iconophile under the iconoclast Leo, that led to him being called the Confessor. 
He is recognized as a saint by the Orthodox Church.31 Theophanes is not portrayed as a 
scholar, so if his identity had not been stated in the title and corroborated by later testimony, it 
 
28 Mango and Scott 1997: Introduction, p. xliv 
29 Mango and Scott 1997: Introduction, p. l 
30 Neville 2018: p. 63 
31 Neville 2018: p. 63 






would have been hard to believe that he, and not another Confessor, was the author of the 
chronicle.32 As it is, ‘our’ Theophanes must be taken to be the author, but as we will see 
shortly, there has been some debate as to how much of the chronicle is his work, and how 
much of it is based on the notes of another Byzantine historian, George Synkellos. 
 
2.3.2 The Chronicle of Theophanes the Confessor 
Before presenting Theophanes’ work, a few remarks on the context of his chronicle are 
necessary. The chronicle bears the name Theophanes Confessor, and it deals with the period 
from the accession of the Roman emperor Diocletian in 284 up until the accession of the 
Byzantine emperor Leo V in 813. In Mango and Scott’s modern translation it constitutes 688 
pages. It represents the continuation of another chronicle, that of George Synkellos. George’s 
work The Chronography of George Synkellos covers the period from the creation of the world 
to Diocletian’s accession. Not much is known about George, except that he was a monk and 
that he for some time resided in a monastery in Palestine before serving as synkellos under the 
patriarch of Constantiople in the years 784-806. George probably died no later than 814. I will 
have more to say about the relationship between the works George and Theophanes shortly.33 
Another work that needs mentioning is a text aptly named Theophanes Continuator. This is a 
composite text that continues where Theophanes stops, with four independent sections which 
together span the period 813-961. The first part is written by an anonymous author, who 
considered himself as a continuator of Theophanes’ work, hence the name of the whole 
work.34 This last work need not concern us, it was written after Theophanes’ death and did not 
have an impact on his Chronicle. To the degree it may have influenced later perceptions of 
Theophanes, I have not found that relevant for the present analysis. 
As we have seen, The Chronicle of Theophanes covers the years 284-813. It purports to be a 
continuation of George Synkellos. According to Theophanes he had been tasked by George 
with finishing the work started by the older man. Theophanes writes the following in the 
opening of his work: 
Since, however, he was overtaken by the end of his life and was unable to bring his plan 
to completion, but, as I have said, had carried his composition down to Diocletian when 
 
32 Mango and Scott 1997: Introduction, pp. l-lii 
33 Mango and Scott 1997: Introduction, pp. xliii-xliv 
34 Kazdhan 1991: pp. 2061-2062 






he left this earthly life and migrated unto the Lord (being in the Orthodox faith), he both 
bequeathed to me, who was his close friend, the book he had written and provided 
materials with a view to completing what was missing.35 
 
It has been a matter of scholarly debate how far we can take Theophanes’ word for him being 
the author of the work that carries his name. Cyril Mango has argued that it was George who 
collected the material for both the earlier and the later part of the work, while Igor Čičurov 
has argued that Theophanes is the actual author of the text.36 
This debate need not concern us here, but two comments can be made. First, Theophanes 
himself states in the above citation that George provided him with materials for completing 
the work. It is of course impossible to infer how extensive this material was, but it shows that 
Theophanes got something. Secondly, no matter the form or size of the material, Theophanes 
has written a different work than George. Whereas George is concerned with establishing 
chronologies and dynastic lists, Theophanes’ text is more narrative in form. This may in part 
be because he deals with a time period that is closer to his own, but Theophanes’ work has its 
own distinct authorial voice, and he bridges the divide between chronicle and classicizing 
histories that I pointed out earlier. 
Still, just like George Synkellos, Theophanes too enumerates each year and lists events for 
each year. Not many Byzantine texts do this consistently, and Theophanes’ text is true to the 
genre of a chronicle. The entry for each year starts with “a listing the year of the world, the 
year since the Incarnation, the regnal year of the Roman Emperor, the Persian Emperor, and 
the bishops of Rome, Constantinople, Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch. After the conquest 
of the Persian Empire, it uses the years of the rulers of the Arabs in place of the Persian 
Emperors.”37 
For all his personal and religious biases, Theophanes describes many events where it is 
possible to discern a more complex ‘reality’ than the writer may have wanted to convey. If 
Theophanes wanted to distort historical facts to suit his own worldview completely, he would 
have glossed over much of what he describes and he would have left out much altogether. 
 
35 Theophanes 1997: p. 1 
36 See reference to this debate in Neville 2018: 61  
37 Neville 2018: 61 






That he does not do this, makes his chronicle an important historical document. I will come 
back to this in my analysis. 
Theophanes is not just an interpreter, of history, he is also important as a source. As he states 
himself: 
I did not set down anything of my own composition, but have made a selection from the 
ancient historians and prose-writers and have consigned to their proper places the events 
of every year, arranged without confusion. In this manner the readers may be able to 
know in which year of each emperor what event took place, be it military or ecclesiastical 
or civic or popular or of any other kind; for I believe that one who reads the actions of the 
ancients derives no small benefit from so doing.38 
 
Especially for the time period 602 to 813 Theophanes is a primary source in the sense that he 
utilized writings that later have been almost entirely lost.39 
In my thesis I have looked Theophanes’ descriptions of the eight emperors that ruled the 
Byzantine empire between 717 and 813. 
A few remarks must be made on the theological question of Iconoclasm since this is of crucial 
importance for Theophanes in his work. Neville writes that Theophanes does not significantly 
insert his own authorial voice into the text before his narrative reaches the reign of the 
emperor Leo III (717-41). Then Theophanes becomes “emotionally invested in telling a 
markedly moralizing story”40 So what was this movement that upset him so? Iconoclasm was 
a major religious movement in the Byzantine world of the eighth and ninth centuries, even 
though its origins were much older.41 It denied the holiness of icons and it rejected the 
veneration of icons.42 Iconoclasm was not accepted by either the Western church or by the 
various Eastern churches as well, and so the dispute was only relevant in the Byzantine 
empire.43 Theophanes was an iconodule, and in his text he clearly abhors the iconoclast 
emperors. As we shall see, this makes all the other characteristics of a ruler less relevant for 
 
38 Theophanes 1997: 2 
39 Mango and Scott 1997: Introduction, p. v 
40 Neville 2018: p. 62 
41 Hussey 2012: pp. 30ff 
42 Kazdhan 1991: p. 975 
43 We will see more on this below, where I analyze Empress Irene’s convening of the Second Council of Nicaea. 






him. Still, to give the old historian credit, in his reports on rulers he clearly disapproves of, he 
can still give them credit for actions well performed. As already mentioned, this gives his text 
credibility in spite of all his invective. 
 
2.3.3 The life of al-Ṭabarī 
Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī was born in Tabaristan, the northern part of modern 
Iran, in 839.44 He came from a land-owning family, but it is unclear whether they were settlers 
of Arab origin from before Tabaristan came under Muslim control, or whether they were non-
Arabs who converted early to Islam. Al-Ṭabarī himself seems to have avoided discussing his 
ancestry.45 At the age of twelve, al-Ṭabarī moved to Ray to study, and later to Baghdad. He 
also spent some years in Syria and Egypt, attending lectures by famous hadīth-scholars. 
Around 870 al-Ṭabarī had established himself as a teacher and writer in Baghdad. Although 
he seems to never have been in close contact with official circles in the ‘Abbasid caliphate, 
his family were connected to the powerful Tāhirids.46 The Tāhirid family played an important 
role in the politics of the caliphate over several generations. The family originated in 
Khurasan, on the modern Iranian-Afghan frontier, and as with the family of al-Ṭabarī, they 
were early converts to Islam.47 Both the Tāhirids and the family of al-Ṭabarī spoke Persian as 
their native language, but they used Arabic on public occasion and always wrote in Arabic. 
The Tāhirids seem to have kept a protective hand over al-Ṭabarī for much of his life.48 
Al-Ṭabarī enjoyed a modest financial independence due to income from his family’s estates in 
Tabaristan, and this gave him freedom to pursue his intellectual interests.49 It was in Baghdad 
that al-Ṭabarī became famous as a scholar. He was a polymath, with a wide range of 
interests.50 He belonged to the traditionalist school of thought which set the cultural tone of 
the ninth century51, and he excelled particularly in the disciplines of legal history, Qur’anic 
studies, and history.52 
 
44 Josephson 2007: p. 59 
45 Josephson 2007: Footnote 6, pp. 59-60 
46 Josephson 2007: pp. 59-60 
47 Kennedy 2006: p. 91 
48 Josephson 2007: p. 59 
49 Al-Ṭabarī 1989: Vol. 1, General Introduction, p. 14 
50 Khalidi 2008: p. 2 
51 Josephson 2007: p. 60 
52 Rydving 2007: p. 11 






Al-Ṭabarī is traditionally most famous for his Commentary on the Qur’an, but his large 
historical chronicle Tarikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk (915), known as History of the Messengers 
and Kings, alternatively History of Prophets and Kings, was also widely read. His historical 
works have had an enormous influence on later historians and his works have functioned a 
model for how history should be written.53 Already in his own time Al-Ṭabarī was deeply 
respected, and this status continued in the intellectual circles of orthodox Islam.  
A modern historian has described al-Ṭabarī in the following way: He “brought to his work the 
scrupulousness and indefatigable longwindedness of the theologian, the accuracy and love of 
order of the scholarly jurist, and the insight into political affairs of the practicing lawyer-
politician.”54 
Al-Ṭabarī seems never to have married.55 He died in Baghdad in 923.56 
 
2.3.4 The Chronicle of al-Ṭabarī 
In the History of the Messengers and Kings, al-Ṭabarī combines the history of Creation and 
prophecy with the history of ancient nations, the Arabic conquests, and a history of the 
Islamic community up to Ṭabarī’s own time. The modern translation of this work, edited by 
Ehsan Yar-Shater, takes up 40 volumes, each of them between 300-500 pages in length. 
Donner calls the overarching structure of al-Ṭabarī’s chronicle a “story-line”, or a master 
narrative. From a Muslim perspective it narrates key episodes in the history of the human 
race; the relationship of humanity to God is traced, along with the evolution of the Muslim 
community. This narrative affirmed the Islamic community as the one of the true faith and it 
explained how that community had come to be what it was in al-Ṭabarī’s day.57 
According to Rosenthal, the composition of the History changes through the work. Pre-
Islamic history is told from the perspective of an Islamized Biblical history, Arab history, and 
Persian history. Annalistic presentation is used when the narrative reaches the time of the 
Prophet Muhammad. Individual years are presented with indications of sources and chains of 
 
53 Rosenthal 1968: p. 135 
54 Rosenthal 1968: 135 
55 Al-Ṭabarī 1989: Vol. 1, General Introduction, p. 33 
56 Al-Ṭabarī 1989: Vol. 1, General Introduction, p. 78 
57 Donner 1998: 129 






transmitters. When al-Ṭabarī reaches his own time, his worldview becomes that of an 
intellectual living in Baghdad under ‘Abbasid rule.58  
As for contemporary political issues,  Rosenthal claims that al-Ṭabarī avoids unfavorable 
details about the ruling ‘Abbasids.59 Donner, on the other hand, does not agree to this last 
point, and states to the contrary that al-Ṭabarī does not gloss over the sharp division between 
the Hāshimite family – the ‘Alids –  and the ‘Abbasid government. Equally it is not clear 
whether he considered the ‘Abbasids an improvement over the Umayyads.60 
Al-Ṭabarī lived in a time of transition, and even though he worked within a literate society, it 
was one where orality was still present as a living tradition.61 The rich oral traditions from the 
Arabian peninsula had begun to be written down only in the late seventh and early eight 
centuries, and in Al-Ṭabarī’s time, they still impacted the form and organization of material. 
Al-Ṭabarī’s method consisted of presenting a consciously created literary imitation of older 
oral traditions. Even though his sources in the main were written works, he reworked them 
into shorter accounts and provided each of them with a chain of transmitters, thus keeping up 
the appearance of oral transmission.62 
This collation of previous texts and oral stories raises the question of how accurate he was in 
his quoting. Since most of his sources are not preserved, the question cannot be satisfactorily 
answered. Even where a source is independently preserved, the possibility exists  that Al-
Ṭabarī used another version or recension. Thus small changes in wording, omissions, or a 
deliberate failure to include all available sources, could seriously alter the narrative. Yet, in 
general, modern historians credit al-Ṭabarī with being a scholar who reported and commented 
on his sources honestly.63 
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As stated above, I have made use of two theorists of history in writing this thesis, Quentin 
Skinner and Micael Mann. 
Skinner writes about the study of history and how a modern historian must approach human 
beings of past societies: 
[…] our only evidence of their beliefs will normally be contained in whatever texts and 
other utterances they may happen to have left behind. It is of course likely that some of 
these may be pervasively marked by hidden codes such as irony. But we have no option 
but to assume that, in general, they can be treated as relatively straightforward 
expressions of beliefs. Unless we can assume some such convention of truthfulness, we 
cannot hope to make any headway with the project of explaining what they believed.64 
 
Skinner goes on to say that the historian identifies the beliefs of his historical subjects, and 
then follows the logical subsequent task of explaining or commenting on them. “[…] it will 
generally be fatal to revise the terms in which they are explained.”65 Historical texts, the 
historians’ sources, have been written in a specific place and time.66 “We need, in short, to be 
ready to take as our province nothing less than the whole of […] the social imaginary, the 
complete range of inherited symbols and representations that constitute the subjectivity of an 
age.”67 This is indeed highly ambitious, and even if I do not aspire to be able to grasp the 
works of Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī in such an all-encompassing sense, I agree with Skinner’s 
statements, and they make up the underlying basis for the present study: I approach the texts 
of both Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī with the assumption that the two medieval historians wrote 
as honestly as they could about the events they describe. If we had available wildly divergent 
alternative histories, or suspected Theophanes or al-Ṭabarī for massive distortion of historical 
facts, the matter would be different. However, Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī are acknowledged 
by modern historians as scrupulous and reliable as far as can be ascertained. 
Michael Mann’s use of sociological methods in analyzing historical phenomena has been of 
more practical value for the present study. Mann has worked extensively with analyzing 
 
64 Skinner 2002: p. 40 
65 Skinner 2002: p. 51 
66 Skinner 2002: p. 57 
67 Skinner 2002: p. 102 






power relations in human societies. In “The Sources of Social Power”, Mann develops a 
theory of how is power exercised in human societies.68 
Initially, though, when I started working on this thesis, I was not sure if his approach and 
methods could be applied to my work. My first ambition was to identify how Theophanes and 
al-Ṭabarī describe the legitimacy of the various rulers – what makes a ruler legitimate or not. 
This turned out to be a fruitless search since the question soon evolved into: Legitimate to 
whom? Theophanes was deeply religious man, and in his text, the fundamental basis for 
legitimacy is the right faith. To Theophanes it is only the iconodule emperors and empress 
Irene that are legitimate. But as we will see below, the rulers Theophanes describes certainly 
have power, or not, independent of their theological positions. Even Theophanes’ descriptions 
reveal this. So legitimacy turned out to be of little use as a basis for analyzing Theophanes. 
Al-Ṭabarī is more nuanced, but here too the question of legitimacy is of less relevance. Al-
Ṭabarī work reflects the basic Islamic premise that a legitimate ruler needed genealogical 
affiliation to the Prophet’s family as a basic requirement for rulership. Legitimacy was thus 
limited to different branches of the same extended family, but internally in the family, the 
question of actual power remained in practice separate from theoretical legitimacy. 
It turned out that this line of investigation was not very fruitful. What seemed much more 
worthwhile, was to look at how Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī describe the actual power of the 
various rulers. In this Mann turned out to be a great clarifier: 
This means that one conceptual distinction between power and authority (i.e., power 
considered legitimate by all affected by it) will not figure much in this book. It is rare to 
find power that is either largely legitimate or largely illegitimate because its exercise is 
normally so double-edged.69 
 
Working through the sources, I found exactly that, legitimacy was a shifty entity; actual 
power turned out to be a much more relevant aspect of how Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī 
describe their rulers. I thus changed my focus to the study of how Theophanes and al-Ţabarī 
depict the power of rulers, and the more I read of Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī, and the more my 
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own categorization evolved, I came to see that Mann’s views would help me in “framing” my 
findings – he gives general categories that help considerably for analyzing sources on a 
micro-level. Mann has written as a general remark on the study of history that “There are 
more social and historical data than we can digest”.70 This certainly applies to the works of 
Theophanes and al-Ţabarī. Mann’ solution to the general problem is to develop a balance 
between theory and historical research. In examining the works of Theophanes and al-Ţabarī, 
I have found Mann’s theories extremely useful and applicable in handling the vast amount of 
information in the two texts. Mann emphasizes how a strong sense of theory makes it possible 
to decide which facts might be the most important, and what might be central and what might 
be marginal in understanding how a particular society works.71 In the following paragraphs I 
sketch out Mann’s main arguments and his theory of the study of power. 
Mann conceives of societies to be constituted of “multiple overlapping and intersecting 
sociospatial networks of power”. He then identifies social power in any given society as 
control over the following four resources: ideological, political, military, and economic. In 
Mann’s view, the interrelations of these four types of social power give the best basis for a 
general account of societies, their structure, and their history. 72 The networks are according to 
Mann, “not dimensions, levels, or factors of a single totality”, but also “organizations, 
institutional means of attaining human goals”. It is not the strength of human desires for 
ideological, economic, military, or political satisfaction that makes for the primacy of these 
four sources of power, but how each of them possess a particular organizational means to 
attain human goals.73 
Mann concedes that this division into four fundamental types of power is a deviation from 
orthodoxy, where traditionally a political category has included control over military forces. 
Mann wants to separate political and military power, into on the one hand the “central polity”, 
including the state apparatus and if existing, the political parties; physical or military force is 
something else according to Mann, and thus a separate category.74 For the present study, this 
is a relevant division. In Theophanes and al-Ţabarī we see that both the Byzantine emperors 
and the Islamic caliphs exemplify this concept: both could hold political power in the center, 
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but in the provinces autonomous generals exercised alternative power. Especially in the 
Islamic empire this constituted an immense challenge to the caliphs. 
Mann criticizes what he calls the conventional way of writing about power relations, and how 
this is done in an abstract language. Mann operates at what he claims to be a more concrete, 
sociospatial and organizational level of analysis. For him the central problems concern the 
capacity to organize and control people, materials, and territories through organization, 
control, logistics, communication, and how this capacity has developed throughout history.75 
He defines power in the most general sense to be the ability “to pursue and attain goals 
through mastery of one’s environment”.76 Social power entails two more specific senses. One 
is mastery exercised over other people. This definition restricts power to its ‘distributive 
aspect’, A’s power over B. In this perspective there is a fixed amount of power – a zero-sum 
game – where power is distributed among the participants. The second aspect of power is 
‘collective’, where people can cooperate and thus enhance their collective power over third 
parties. These two aspects of power, distributive and collective, operate simultaneously and 
intertwined in most social relations.77 
Mann further elaborates his argument: when people enter into cooperative, collective power 
relations with one another, their implementation of collective goals entails social organization 
and division of labor. This in turn leads to social stratification – those at the top have immense 
organizational superiority over the rest of society. “The few at the top can keep the masses at 
the bottom compliant, provided their control is institutionalized in the laws and the norms of 
the social group in which both operate.”78 This ensures that the masses comply, since they 
lack the collective organization to oppose those who control the distributive and collective 
power organizations in any given society – “They are organizationally outflanked”.79 As I 
stated above, Mann points out that the question of whether power is considered legitimate by 
those affected by it,  does not figure much in his theory.80 
This last point is probably where my findings are most out of tune with Mann, because both 
Theophanes and al-Ţabarī are very much concerned with legitimacy. At the same time, 
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however, in both their works it is obvious that the conceptual distinction between power and 
authority in many instances is a moot point: whoever controls the power organizations in the 
Byzantine or the Islamic societies, are the ones who prevail, regardless of legitimacy. In that 
sense, Mann is right in placing little emphasis on it. Yet, as we will see below, in Theophanes 
and al-Ţabarī’s conceptions of what make a powerful ruler, the question of legitimacy is 
important. 
Mann’s next elaboration is the concept of four ideal-typical forms of organizational reach: 
extensive, intensive, authoritative, and diffused power. ‘Extensive power’ “refers to the ability 
to organize large numbers of people over far-flung territories in order to engage in minimally 
stable cooperation.” And then ‘intensive power’, which “refers to the ability to organize 
tightly and command a high level of mobilization or commitment from the participants, 
whether the area and numbers covered are great or small”.81 He then writes that this talk of 
power as organizations may convey a misleading impression, “as if societies were merely 
collections of large, authoritative power organizations”.82 This they are not, power can be less 
organized, in market exchange, for example, in which people through exchange achieve 
separate goals. Even though it embodies distributive power, it may possess little authoritative 
organization to enforce this power. It is a form of human power, but with little authoritative 
organization. Having said this, Mann distinguishes his two next types of power: 
‘Authoritative power’, which is “actually willed by groups and institutions. It comprises 
definite commands and conscious obedience.” And lastly, ‘diffused power’, which “spreads in 
a more spontaneous, unconscious, decentered way throughout a population, resulting in 
similar social practices that embody power relations but are not explicitly commanded”. 
Diffused power does not comprise command and obedience, but “an understanding that these 
practices are natural or moral or result from self-evident common interest”.83 
Additionally, Mann points out that most theorists prefer abstract notions of social structure, 
ignoring geographical and sociospatial aspects of societies.84 This aspect of power will be 
relevant for my analysis below, where we will see that the situation for the rulers in 
Byzantium was different than for the rulers of the vast Islamic empire. 
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Mann’s nuances cannot be further described here. What remains is to give a short overview of 
his main classificatory principle: four sources of social power: 
 
Ideological: Mann defines ideological power through two distinct means. The first is a 
“transcendent vision” of social authority, where human beings are united through the claim 
that they possess “ultimately meaningful, often divinely granted, common qualities”. These 
qualities are claimed to be the essence of humanity, divided though it may be by other 
“secular” organizations of economic, military, and political power. This transcendence has 
often taken a divine form: igniting common humanity is a spark that comes from God.85 
Mann’s second means of ideological power is “immanence”, where the strengthening of the 
internal morale of some existing social group gives it a sense of ultimate significance and 
meaning in the cosmos. This reinforces the group’s normative solidarity and gives it common 
ritual and aesthetic practices.86 
Political: In Mann’s view, political power consists of two means. The first is “territorial 
centralization”, where dominant social groups, in pursuit of their goals, “require social 
regulation over a confined, bounded territory”.87 This is highly relevant for studying the 
differences between Theophanes and al-Ţabarī. A second means of political power is 
“geopolitical diplomacy”. Since no known state has been able to control all relations crossing 
its boundaries, much social power has remained “transnational”, making possible “the 
diffusion of both transnational class relations and transcendent ideologies”.88 
Military: The means of military power, according to Mann, are “concentrated coercion”. 
Both in battle, obviously, but also from its uses in peacetime. Mann argues that in peacetime 
use the “compulsory cooperation” that military force ensures, is a means “of controlling 
societies and of increasing their collective powers by intensifying the exploitation of 
concentrated pockets of labor”.89 Mann also writes that most historic states have not 
possessed a monopoly of organized military force, and that conquest may be undertaken by 
military states that are independent of their home states, a third point to note is that military 
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organization, even if under state control, is usually institutionally separate from other state 
agencies.90 
While the first means of military power is clearly relevant for the present analysis, using 
Mann’s second perspective, is very useful in highlighting the differences between Theophanes 
and al-Ţabarī. As for Mann’s other perspectives on military power, we will see that here too, 
they are relevant in identifying differences. 
Economic: Mann terms the means of economic power “circuits of praxis”. Arguing that 
economic power distinctly integrates two spheres of activity, he elaborates: The first sphere is 
“the active intervention of human beings through labor”. The second is how “goods taken 
from nature are circulated and exchanged for transformation and ultimately for consumption”. 
Economic power gives access to both the activities of the mass of the people, and to the 
communications circuits of society. Mann describes it as a “formidable and essential part of 
any stable power structure”.91 
Mann’s four categories constitutes a classificatory system, but that does not mean that the four 
categories have been of equal importance at all times. In various times and places, they have 
each of them offered “enhanced capacity for organization that has enabled the form of its 
organization to dictate for a time the form of societies at large”.92 On the contrary, as Mann 
points out, the various historical societies he bases his research on, show distinct differences 
in this regard. Power in one society may be based on ideology and politics more than on 
economic and military might, or vice versa. As we shall see below, this emphasis on the 
different capacities for organization will be important in analyzing Theophanes and al-Ţabarī. 
Both describe certain capacities as much more important than others. 
As I read through the works of Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī, it became more and more clear that 
this aspect of Mann’s theory – the difference in categorical emphasis – could be seen in both 
works. Even though the various descriptions of Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī can be placed in all 
of Mann’s general four categories, it is clear that the majority of them fits in the ideology 
category. This will be reflected in my analysis below. As I have found many more 
descriptions of ideological power in both writers, they constitute a larger part of the analysis 
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than the other three. One simple observation can explain why: in my reading and sifting of the 
texts, there gradually emerged a set of sub-categories under the general category for ideology. 
Whereas the other three main categories continued to be sufficient as categories to place 
descriptions in, the ideological category needed a more comprehensive way of detailing 
descriptions. In the following chapter this is what I hope to demonstrate. 
Chapter 3 A quantitative analysis 
To assess the two chronicles on a quantitative level, I have searched through the descriptions 
of all the rulers one by one, to find the relevant passages which describe various aspects of the 
rulers’ power according to Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī. The scope of this thesis does not allow 
for including these passages in full. However, what I do in this chapter, is to give a synthesis 
of the characteristics that emerge for each ruler. Due to the length of the sources, the summary 
I made to arrive at my list of categories is itself too long to include here. It is therefore to be 
found in appendices A and B, for Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī respectively. 
So what do I find when looking for descriptions of power? Initially when one reads the two 
sources, the vast number of events and people described is overwhelming. However, after a 
while, a repeating pattern emerges. I have already written something on this in the general 
descriptions of the two chronicles. Although Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī describe a wide 
variety of events and the succession of many rulers, there are some recurring tropes and 
themes in both their descriptions of power. What emerges is a finite number of concepts that 
are similar in both authors, and this makes categorization and comparison possible.  
At the same time, the study reveals that the contents of a category may be slightly different in 
each author, even though the general characteristics of the category may be the same. This is 
exactly what I want to study closer, and what we will look at below. 
Since the two works are so different in length, it is not possible to compare the number of 
instances a category is used. Rather, I have looked at the emphasis each historian has put on 
the various categories – how often, relative to the other categories, a particular category has 
been used. Even this is not possible to enumerate exactly, but certain tendencies can be 
discerned. 
I first turn to Theophanes. 






3.1 Summary of relevant source material in Theophanes’ Chronicle 
So, how does Theophanes write about each ruler’s power? The following is an overview over 
the most important characteristics given by Theophanes. The historical accuracy of these 
descriptions is not relevant here. What matters is how Theophanes portrays events. In some 
instances, I point out if Theophanes is wildly inaccurate according to contemporary views. 
Whether he did this consciously, to obscure the facts and enhance his own view of things, or 
whether he himself believed what he wrote, is of course impossible to ascertain. The point 
here is to convey Theophanes’ view of the various rulers. Before looking at each ruler, it is 
useful to start with an overview of which rulers will be studied. 
 
List of Byzantine rulers: 
 
Reigns: Rulers:       
717-741 Leo III (the Isaurian)      
741-775 Constantine V       
741-743 Artabasdos (rival emperor at Constantinople) 
775-780 Leo IV the Khazar      
780-790 Constantine VI the Blinded and his mother Irene the Athenian (regent) 
791-797 Constantine VI (formally alone but with Irene)  
797-802 Irene alone       
802-811 Nikephoros I       
811-811 Staurakios       
811-813 Michael I Rangabe  
 
Now, let us look more closely at the individual rulers and how Theophanes describe their 
different means of power. 
 






717-741 Leo III (the Isaurian) 
Breaks his promise/Iconoclast – Bad omens/religious failing – Legitimate succession – Breaks 
his promise/Iconoclast – Political/diplomatic failure, Political failure – Political/military 
success – Religious failure/Iconoclast – Religious failure/Iconoclast – Diplomatic failure – 
Military failure – Avarice – General condemnation of Leo’ rule 
 
741-743 Artabasdos (rival emperor in Constantinople) 
Orthodox/Iconodule – Military and political failure 
 
741-775 Constantine V 
Religious failure/Iconoclast – Military and political challenge – Religious failure/Iconoclast – 
Military and political success – Brutal –  Bad omen/Religious failure/ Disfavored by God – 
Legitimate succession – Religious failure/Iconoclast – Conscious (good) ruler – Military 
failure – Military success –  Religious failure/bad omens – Brutal/religious persecution –  
Conscious (good) ruler –  Brutal/religious persecution –  Avarice –  Immoral/depraved –  
Avarice –  Popular/Generous –  Legitimate succession –  Brutal/religious persecution –  
Military success –  Military failure/inept 
 
775-780 Leo IV the Khazar 
Popular/Generous – Iconophile/Orthodox: (for a while) – Popular/Legitimate succession: 
written declarations on the holy table/crowns his son in the Hippodrome – Military success – 
Avarice/dies from wounds inflicted by wearing the crown 
 
780-790 Irene the Athenian (regent) 
Orthodox/Iconophile – Political control – Legitimate – Brutal – Orthodox – Good omens – 
Political/diplomatic success – Military success – Military failure – Military success – 
Orthodox/religious/political leader (Nicaea) – Diplomatic/military/political/(personal) failure 
– Political failure 
 






791-797 Constantine VI alone 
Political success/deposes his mother – Weak rule/proclaims Irene co-emperor – Military 
failure/political unrest – Brutal – Theological failure – Military failure – Weak/deposed by his 
mother 
 
797-802 Irene alone 
Popular – Diplomatic failure – Military failure – Political/diplomatic success – Generous – 
Politically weak – Dethroned 
 
802-811 Nikephoros I 
Illegitimate succession – Bad omens – Treacherous – Succession, but Staurakios is 
“unsuitable” – Weak religious/political control – Military failure – Military failure – Avarice 
– Brutal/depraved – Religious/political failure – Military failure – Religious failure/liar – 
Unpopular – Brutal/not to be trusted – Brutal/avarice – Bad omen – Heretic – Heretic/brutal – 
Greedy/unjust – Military loss – Humiliated – Negative characteristics 
 
811-811 Staurakios 
Unlucky – Political failure – Forced to abdicate 
 
811-813 Michael I Rangabe 
Makes promises – Legitimate – Generous – Orthodox – Diplomatic success – Legitimate – 
Succession – Generous – Theological dispute (Iconophile, but there is a call for a return to 
Iconoclasm) – Military failure – Political and theological conflict – Military failure/abdication 
 
3.2 Categories in Theophanes 
We thus have many different types of descriptions of the rulers. The following is my attempt 
to categorize the relevant descriptions of various types of power. The features of each 
category are a synthesis of the various opinions, perceptions, events, places, objects and so on, 
that we find in Theophanes. A great many details are thus lost in my summary, but we will 
look at some of these specifics when we analyze a sample of relevant sources below, in 






Chapter 4. In my reading of Theophanes I have found the following set of categories that 









- Economic  
 
The following is a short summary of the contents of each category: 
Orthodox (Iconoclast or Iconodule: Does the ruler uphold the correct faith? Control over 
various religious institutions, including synods and ‘schools’; ‘Ritual’ ability: holder of 
speeches/sermons; God’s representative on Earth: ‘The good ruler’- an inspiration to the 
people.) 
Omens (Omens related to the ruler’s person/behavior; The empire’s prospects based on the 
ruler’s person/behavior) 
Legitimate (Genealogy/proximity to a legitimate ancestor; Acclamation/oath of allegiance; 
Letters concerning allegiance or refutation; Symbols - regalia) 
Pious (Personal behavior; Favored/disfavored by God; Does the ruler live up to moral 
standards? Does the ruler have moral rectitude?) 
Personality (Strong/weak; Brutal/lenient; Avaricious/generous; Keeps promises; Stable 
mood; Trustworthy; Wise; Lucky; Dutiful; Conscientious; Popular) 
Political (Control over the military; the bureaucracy; the elite) 
Diplomatic (Control over diplomatic relations) 






Military (Control over the military; Ability as a strategic and tactical commander; 
Responsibility for military success/failure) 
Economic (Control over economic policy, taxes, payment to military forces, donations to the 
religious institutions and gifts to people) 
 
3.3 Summary of relevant source material in al-Ṭabarī’s chronicle 
I now move on to how al-Ṭabarī describe how the Islamic rulers wielded power. As with 
Theophanes, I first list an overview of the relevant rulers, before listing the summaries for the 
individual rulers. Finally, I list the common categories that I find. 
 
List of Islamic rulers 
 
The Islamic rulers I study, are the first seven ‘Abbasid caliphs. 
Reigns: Rulers:        
749-754 Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Saffāh      
754-775 Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr       
775-785 Al-Mahdī        
785-786 Mūsā al-Hādī        
786-809 Hārūn al-Rashīd       
809-813 Muḥammad al-Amīn       
813-833 ‘Abdallāh b. Hārūn al-Maʾmūn  
 
749-754 Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Saffāh 
Legitimate: Genealogy – Controlling wealth – Pious – Brutal – Orthodox – Weak ruler – No 
war leader   
 






754-775 Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr 
Legitimate: Genealogy – Personal weakness/military weakness – Brave, but not a military 
leader – Political weakness – Political/military weakness – Benevolent/pious – Piety – 
Entertainment was never seen in al-Mansur’s house – Humble/self-reflection – Magnanimous 
– Cunning – Angry – Shifting appearances/personality – Magic – Use of astrologer – Impious 
– Avoiding a sworn contract – Debatable legitimacy – Stinginess – Building Baghdad – 
Devious/evil – Wise – Lacking religious authority – Asserting religious authority 
 
775-785 Al-Mahdī Volume 29 
Insignia of royalty: The staff of the Prophet and the Prophet’s mantle, and the seal of the 
caliphate – His bad Arabic – Generous – Weak, and easily influenced by his wife – Conflict 
over legitimacy – Pious – Dissolute and licentious 
 
785-786 Mūsā al-Hādī 
Politically weak – Politically weak – Personally weak – Political/personal weakness – 
Negligent of duties – Shifting personality – Harelip 
 
786-809 Hārūn al-Rashīd 
Insignia of royalty: The Prophet’s cloak, the sword, and the parasol, the seal ring, and scepter 
– Succession: documents signed at Mecca and deposited in the Ka'bah – Military: initially a 
joke/then successful – Politically weak: initially – Immature/weak – Generous – Improves in 
stature – Generous – Pious – Has God’s favor – Lacks political control – Dynastic control – 
Needs legal backing in formal decisions/needs a judge – Weak – Donations, poetry, literature, 
religious law 
 
809-813 Muḥammad al-Amīn 
Religious failure: tears up his father’s letters in Mecca – Too young – Hailed as nobly born – 
Asserting control – Weak: cannot assert control over his brother – Insignia of royalty: seal, 
scepter, and the mantle of the Prophet – Weak – Politically weak: Authority contested – 






Generous – Heedless of signs: astrologer and the Moon (brave?) – Not too evil – Loses 
authority – Resented – Bad omens – Frivolous – Ignominious death 
 
813-833 ‘Abdallāh b. Hārūn al-Maʾmūn 
Succession – strong – Weak/small economic control – Economic control – Politically weak – 
Political failure – Religious/political failure – Religious/political failure – Religious failure – 
Politically weak – Politically weak – Controlling succession – Controlling succession – 
Controlling succession – Not controlling succession – Not controlling succession – 
Succession/economy – weak – Succession/political – weak – Succession/political – weak – 
Succession/political - weak – Succession/political control – Economic control – Economic 
ideal – Economic control – Geography (Andalusia outside of the caliph’s control) – Economic 
control – Theological control – Military control – Military control – Political control – 
Military/political/diplomatic control – Theological control/losing control 
 
3.4 Categories in al-Ţabarī 
As we saw with Theophanes, there are many different types of descriptions of the rulers in al-
Ţabarī as well. Again I have categorized the relevant descriptions of various types of power. 
Here too the features of each category are a synthesis of the various opinions, perceptions, 
events, places, objects and so on, that I find, this time in al-Ţabarī. In al-Ţabarī I find the 









- Economic  
 






An initial point is that I find the same set of categories in both Theophanes and al-Ţabarī. I 
will come back to that important point below. Let us first look at a short summary of the 
contents of each category from al-Ţabarī’s work: 
Orthodox (Sunni or Shia (‘Alid): does the ruler uphold the correct faith? Control over various 
religious institutions, including who leads the annual Pilgrimage to Mecca; ‘Ritual’ ability: 
holder of speeches/sermons; God’s representative on Earth: ‘The good ruler’- an inspiration to 
the people.) 
Omens (Omens related to the ruler’s person/behavior; The empire’s prospects based on the 
ruler’s person/behavior) 
Legitimate (Genealogy/proximity to a legitimate ancestor; Acclamation/oath of allegiance; 
Letters concerning allegiance or refutation; Symbols - regalia) 
Pious (Personal behavior; Favored/disfavored by God; Does the ruler live up to moral 
standards? Does the ruler have moral rectitude?) 
Personality (Strong/weak; Brutal/lenient; Avaricious/generous; Keeps promises; Stable 
mood; Trustworthy; Wise; Lucky; Dutiful; Conscientious; Popular) 
Political (Control over the military; the bureaucracy; the elite) 
Diplomatic (Control over diplomatic relations) 
Military (Control over the military; Ability as a strategic and tactical commander; 
Responsibility for military success/failure) 
Economic (Control over economic policy, taxes, payment to military forces, donations to the 
religious institutions and gifts to people) 
 
3.5 Counting categories 
The summaries of how Theophanes and al-Ţabarī describe the power of the emperors and the 
caliphs can now be compared. As I mentioned above, I find the same set of categories in both 
Theophanes and al-Ţabarī. They are the following: 
- Orthodox 
- Omens 












- Economic  
 
The list of categories above can be grouped into Mann’s broad categorization, his four main 
divisions, Ideological, Political, Military, and Economic power. As I have shown above, the 
Ideological category needs to be further divided into the following sub-categories Orthodox, 
Omens, Legitimate, Pious – they are all related to ideological power; the main category of  
political power is also sub-divided, into Political and Diplomatic categories. Finally the 
categories Military and Economic are similar to Mann’s military and economic power. 
This in is an interesting result. Now, it could be that my listing is biased, that I wanted to 
“get” this result, and so shaped the listing to get it. But I will argue that this is not so. In 
reading both Theophanes and al-Ţabarī these are the themes that recur again and again in both 
writers. Does that mean that Theophanes and al-Ţabarī describe the same kind of societies? 
The fact that the categories are basically identical, serves to confirm this, and in a broad sense 
this is true – both the Byzantine and the Islamic empires were agrarian, pre-industrial 
societies. However, it is when we go into the details that interesting similarities and 
differences manifest themselves. The investigation of these similarities and differences are the 
essence of my thesis, and I will analyze relevant details in Chapter 4 below. For now, it is the 
quantitative aspects of the categories that will be discussed. 
To repeat: even though the summaries show some differences, they are also to a large degree 
similar. This fact confirms Mann’s categorization. His work, after all, is based on a meta-
analysis of extensive research on pre-industrial societies from a diverse geographical range 
and large timespans, including those of Theophanes and al-Ţabarī. The task in this thesis is to 
scrutinize these general tendencies and see how they manifest themselves in Theophanes and 
al-Ţabarī. 






An important point that emerges from this is that Mann’s categories are not equally important 
in Theophanes and al-Ţabarī. We see how Mann’s principle of emphasis becomes important, 
the importance of any on category differs in time and place. The descriptions given in 
Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī reveal emphasis on the ideological category in particular. 
The ideological aspect of power is obviously important to both Theophanes and al-Ţabarī. 
Whether this reflects the actual historical realities, is not of major importance for my 
purposes. I register what Theophanes and al-Ţabarī find to be important. Still, I want to point 
out what Mann says about this time period: he argues that the role of extensive ideological 
movements like Christianity and Islam has been historically confined to the time period from 
about 200 B.C. to about A.D. 1200. The reorganizing powers of salvationist religions were 
particularly strong in this period, according to Mann. Before this period, it was not possible 
due to a lack of infrastructural inventions like diffused literacy and the emergence of trading 
networks interstitial to contemporary empires. Later the European, secular multistate system 
made the reorganizing role of ideological power less important in that part of the world. Mann 
does not mention later development in the Islamic world, but it is not of relevance in this 
thesis.93 The important thing is to note that ideological power is important to Theophanes and 
al-Ţabarī, which fits well with Mann’s analysis. 
A final point is that Theophanes and al-Ţabarī may use the same categories, but due to the 
very different lengths of their respective texts, it not possible to compare the two numerically; 
I will therefore study the relative frequency of categories in the two works. 
With the above proviso, I will argue that the categories are sufficiently equal to warrant a 
comparison. Let us thus take a closer look at what emerges when I list the categories 
schematically. The minus symbol signifies a negative side to the ruler in the relevant 
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Table 1: A quantitative list of rulers and descriptions in Theophanes:  
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Table 2: A quantitative list of rulers and descriptions in al-Ţabarī 
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Whether positive or negative, we see that the majority of the descriptions fall in the ideology 
category. As for the various sub-categories in ideology, the differences are not large, except 
for orthodoxy. This sub-category is more prevalent in Theophanes than al-Ţabarī, and 
Theophanes uses more negative characteristics. Both results are to be expected given 
Theophanes’ theological position.  
The military category is more prevalent in Theophanes, which must be because Theophanes 
describes the various emperors and their campaigns, whereas the rulers in al-Ţabarī do not 
often participate in campaigns personally. 
The economic category is deceptive in that Theophanes has fewer listings than al-Ţabarī, but 
the descriptions in Theophanes’ work are more detailed (with one exception, as we shall see 
below). 
As these short comments show, simple numerical listings are deceptive: they do not allow for 
a proper evaluation of the differences in the descriptions. What is useful, though, is how this 
type of listing clarifies the relative weighting of the various categories. 
To conclude this chapter on the quantitative aspect of the sources: On the surface it seems that 
Theophanes and al-Ţabarī find the same aspects of a ruler relevant for his/her power. The 
differences emerge when we look at the details. The following chapter do just that: for each 
category a selection of passages from both historians will be compared. 
Chapter 4 A qualitative analysis 
Before analyzing extracts from the sources in detail a few preliminary remarks are in order. 
Firstly, I use what I consider to be relevant examples from each of the sources, those that best 
exemplify the essence of each of Mann’s four categories. They will not necessarily be the 
same number from Theophanes and al-Ţabarī – it depends more on relevance than numerical 
parity. 
Secondly, the situations and events I have chosen are typical – systemic – not just anecdotal. 
They exemplify the structural phenomena which are possible to extract from Theophanes and 
al-Ţabarī. They write repeatedly about phenomena occurring again and again, such as 
religious and political rituals, military events, and some economic topics. I show this for each 
of Mann’s main categories through a main example plus references to relevant and/or similar 
situations. 






Finally, there is the challenge of how to differentiate between the four categories when 
choosing examples. As we will see, it is in particular the separation between ideological and 
political aspects that can be difficult. 
 
4.1 Ideological 
This section analyses two important events in the Byzantine Empire and in the ‘Abbasid 
caliphate, respectively. The first event is the Byzantine emperor Leo IV’s effort to secure the 
succession of his son, the future Constantine VI, in the year 775. The second event is the 
Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd actions, in the year 802, to secure the successions of three of his sons, 
and the order in which they should succeed each other. 
Leo IV’s arrangements 
We look at the Byzantine example first. The year 775 was the first in the reign of Leo.94 His 
father, Constantine V had died the year before, from an unknown disease while on campaign 
against the Bulgarians.95 According to Theophanes, Leo is initially popular among the people 
and the notables. Leo appears to be pious, orthodox, an iconophile and a friend to the “holy 
Mother of God and of the monks”.96 Theophanes was an iconophile and so initially in his 
descriptions he is content with Leo. 
To improve his ability to control internal events in the empire, Leo increases the number of 
military contingents in each of the themata, the military divisions (and territorial units) of the 
empire, each administered by a governor, the strategos, who combined both military and civil 
power.97 Leo also increases the tagmata, the contingents of the professional army under the 
direct command of the emperor.98 All this, writes Theophanes, makes the emperor very 
popular and results in the commanders of the themata entering Constantinople with a great 
throng of men, to request that Leo’s son, Constantine, be made emperor.99 It is not obvious 
that the rich strategoi – members of the leading Byzantine families –  should support an 
emperor. Sometimes there were serious conflicts between the powerful strategoi and the 
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emperors. The creation of a professional army of tagmata by Constantine V was to be a 
counterweight to the power of the strategoi.100 
That the strategoi now want Leo’s son as emperor, shows how popular he must have been. 
The event takes place during Easter, which was an important religious festival for the 
Byzantines. Theophanes does not say so explicitly, but it is probably not a coincidence that 
the matter of succession to the imperial throne was dealt with during such a symbol-laden 
period in the Christian calendar. As the unfolding of events show, it is also obvious that it was 
carefully planned. As Theophanes describes it, Leo replies to the strategoi and other nobles, 
“[…] according to imperial custom: ‘My son is an only child and I am afraid of doing so lest I 
suffer the fate of all men and, while he is an infant, you put him to death and appoint 
another.’” The men assure Leo under oath that they will not be ruled by anyone other than 
Leo’s son, should Leo die.101 Leo’s hesitancy may reflect genuine concern, or it may be a 
more ritualistic modesty. It is hard to tell from Theophanes’ text which it is, but a set of 
ceremonies now take place in Constantinople: “From Palm Sunday until Holy Thursday the 
people importuned him and gathered in the Hippodrome to make this request, and on Holy 
Friday he ordered them to take the oath.”102 Theophanes goes on to describe how all the 
people, those of the themata, the members of the Senate, the City tagmata and “all the citizens 
and artisans swore on the holy and life-giving Cross not to accept an emperor other than Leo 
and Constantine and their descendants, and they set down their oath in signed documents”.103 
That this collective oath-taking takes place in the Hippodrome is no coincidence, the large 
horse-racing arena was at the center of Constantinople’s public life. Theophanes describes its 
use over the centuries: it is a place for different types of public entertainment, not only horse 
races; it is a place for the emperor to meet the population of Constantinople, and by extension, 
the empire, both as a political and a religious figure; it is a place for public executions and for 
public shaming; it is also a place for victorious emperors and generals to celebrate triumphs 
after victory in war against the empire’s enemies. 
Theophanes then goes on to describe what happens on the next day, Holy Saturday: Leo goes 
to the Great Palace, and the Tribunal of the Nineteen Couches. Together with other male 
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family members and the young Constantine, Leo then proceeds to the “Great Church” – Hagia 
Sophia – where Constantine is confirmed as emperor: 
[…] and, after changing the altar-cloth according to imperial custom, he mounted the 
ambo with his son and the patriarch. All the people entered the church and deposited their 
written declarations on the holy table. The emperor addressed them as follows: ’Behold, 
brethren, I am fulfilling your request and granting you my son as emperor. Behold, you 
are receiving him from the Church and from Christ's hand.’104 
 
Here we see the emperor changing the altar-cloth, which was the tradition on Holy 
Saturday.105  He mounts the ambo with his son and the patriarch – this is an important 
symbolic act: the ambo was one of the two liturgical focal points of the church (the other 
being the altar). It was from the ambo liturgy usually opened and closed, and in Hagia Sophia 
the choir sang from beneath it. Other important liturgical rituals also took place on the ambo 
or on its stairs.106 On this occasion, after Leo has mounted the ambo, “all the people entered 
the church and deposited their written declarations on the holy table”.107 The holy table is the 
altar.108  Located in the sanctuary behind the templon, the screen separating the nave from the 
sanctuary109, the altar in Byzantine commentaries is interpreted simultaneously as Jesus’ 
tomb, the table of the Last Supper, Golgotha, the heavenly altar, and the throne of God. The 
altar was a dread symbol of God’s dwelling, and the rites of access to the altar in Eucharist 
and ordination rites reflect this.110 Thus, to deposit the declarations here was no trivial matter. 
Then follows Leo’s address to the people: “’Behold, brethren, I am fulfilling your request and 
granting you my son as emperor. Behold, you are receiving him from the Church and from 
Christ’s hand.’” The people “cried out in a loud voice, saying: ’Be our surety, Ο Son of God, 
that we are receiving the lord Constantine as our emperor from Thy hand that we may guard 
him and die for his sake!’”111 
The next day, Easter Sunday, Leo crowns his son in the Hippodrome. At daybreak, the 
emperor goes to the Hippodrome, together with the patriarch. A portable altar is brought, and 
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the patriarch recites the prayer “in the presence of all the people and the emperor crowned his 
son”. Then the two emperors “processed to the Great Church together with the two Caesars 
and the three nobilissimi”.112 
This event serves to highlight a crucial component of the Byzantine – and perhaps even more 
accurately, the Constantinopolitan – ideological power system, namely the rites concerning 
the imperial succession. The Imperial City was crucial in the succession rituals. The various 
steps in the process exemplifies rituals that recur again and again at the center of the 
Byzantine Empire, in Constantinople. It is even more limited: the events take place in a few 
major areas and buildings in Constantinople. This pattern repeats itself through most of the 
Byzantine Empire’s existence.113  The tenth century Byzantine text The Book of Ceremonies 
describes many of these rituals in detail. The descriptions are an amalgam of sources, some 
dating back to the sixth century. 114 Combined with what Theophanes writes, we get a vivid 
impression of how important the imperial rituals in Constantinople were for the ideology of 
the empire. 
Leo IV’s arrangements are therefore in their physical expressions typical of a ritual that 
enhances and confirms the ideological power of the emperor. This whole series of events are 
illuminating, they show the complexity in the power relations between an emperor on the one 
hand, and the Byzantine elite and the people on the other. 
Fifteen years later it turns out that Leo was correct in fearing for his son. As Theophanes tells 
it, the men that gave the oath to the infant Constantine, are the same men who later flagrantly 
betrays Constantine: “For the same men who fifteen years earlier had sworn that terrible oath 
and made signed declarations which they deposited in the holy sanctuary, then swore to Irene 
that they would not be ruled by her son as long as she was alive.” 115 It turns out that an oath 
is not to be trusted after all, and this shows the difficulties an emperor had in securing his 
children’s succession. No matter how legitimate an heir was, he would have to be able to 
actually keep himself in power when the time came to ascend the imperial throne. 
The status of a Byzantine emperor was not based on genealogy, even less primogeniture. The 
history of Byzantium can be described as a series of dynasties which tried to establish 
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themselves but where none of these families managed to last beyond three or four 
generations.116 The concept “[…] offended against an old ‘republican’ sensibility, the dual 
conviction that power was received by delegation (from the people or from God) and that it 
was exercised in the context of a res publica or state”.117 The Byzantines had a state, as the 
peoples in the former western part of the Roman empire did not anymore. Where the Pope in 
Rome came to represent an autonomous religious power, the status of the Byzantine emperors 
was more complex: they were not priests nor were they simply worldly kings. Their status 
revolved endlessly “round the insoluble problem of the king-priest, but rarely tackled it head 
on”.118 As the eastern part of the Roman empire evolved into the Byzantine empire, the role of 
the emperor developed in tandem with that of the Byzantine church and the monastic orders. 
The notion of royal priesthood existed in a few texts or rituals, but the balance of power 
between the emperor and the ecclesiastical hierarchy settled over the centuries into a difficult 
equilibrium.119 In addition, the empire as an ideological and political entity had an existence 
independent of the emperors and the various families trying to establish dynasties. Three 
aspects should be pointed out. The first is the vast administrative and juridical construction 
that constituted the Byzantine state; even if the emperors in part controlled it, they never 
entirely identified with it. The second aspect is the conception of the existence that was to be 
found in the Old and New Testaments – here the divine choice passed from the Jewish people 
to Rome – and it could not be coincidence, in the eyes of the Byzantines, that the Incarnation 
of Christ corresponded to the accession of Augustus.120 In the Byzantine understanding, the 
last emperor of Constantinople would voluntarily abdicate on the Day of Judgement, when 
Christ returned. The third aspect is the half Hellenistic, half Christian symbolic form of the 
human kingdom on Earth as a reflection of the celestial kingdom of God: the sovereign down 
below was only the delegate of the one on high.121 Especially the time of succession was 
difficult. The transitional period when an emperor died and a new one took the reins of power, 
was a moment of great instability for the society. As Dagron writes: 
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[…] there were no institutional criteria to test its legitimacy, only historical and moral 
references, accumulated examples which eventually came to constitute a rule of the game, 
with innumerable variations, and tacitly to define transgression in the absence of a 
procedure. Each new emperor had to observe these rules if he wanted to achieve 
legitimacy.122 
 
A complex situation, indeed. Theophanes’ descriptions of what happened in Constantiople 
during the Easter celebrations of 775, confirms this. 
For Theophanes a legitimate ruler must first and foremost be an upholder of the orthodox 
faith, but Theophanes cannot escape the fact that other factors decided who occupied the 
throne, so it is not legitimacy as such, but “imperial power” – that amalgam of different 
ideological factors I have pointed out above – that decided. Despite his bias, Theophanes 
cannot wholly distort what seems to have been both accepted and approved behavior in a 
ruler. 
As another example of how imperial power could be said to be ‘external to” the actual person 
being emperor, I want to use Theophanes’ description of the fate of the emperor Michael I 
Rangabe in 813. Michael sets out with an army to defeat the Bulgarians. He has already failed 
once in the previous year.123 The campaign in 813 is an even worse disaster, Michael is bested 
by the Bulgarians and has to flee back to Constantinople. “As for the emperor, he was making 
his homeward escape, cursing the army and its commanders and swearing he would abdicate 
the Empire. […]124 The emperor wants to abdicate! This is a very different role than the image 
of a powerful ruler on the imperial throne. The patriarch in Constantinople initially prevents 
Michael from abdicating, but then: “When the strategoi and the army had learnt that the 
emperor had fled to the City, they despaired of being ruled by him any longer and, having 
taken counsel among themselves, implored (the patrician) Leo, strategos of the Anatolics, to 
help the common cause and protect the Christian state.”125 Now that the strategos Leo 
consents to becoming emperor, Michael can abdicate: “On being informed of his 
proclamation, Michael, together with Prokopia and their children, sought refuge in the chapel 
of the Pharos, where they cut off their hair and donned monastic garb […].” The Bulgarians 
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invade all the way to Constantinople and plunder the suburbs, before returning home.126 The 
consequences for Constantinople are severe, even though the city itself remains undefeated. It 
is the city itself that ensures the survival of the Byzantine empire. The impregnable walls 
protect the crucial kernel of the state – the central imperial administration and church 
bureaucracy. The chaos at the top of the Byzantine state hierarchy does not cause the empire 
to collapse, but this is not because of the emperor, but in spite of him. 
We thus see that status of emperor is not too closely linked to the actual person, but the 
abilities he can bring to the execution of role: there needs to be an emperor, but it is the 
position as head of the state that is vital, not necessarily who occupies that position. 
 
The succession arrangements of the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd 
In the Islamic world, the question of caliphal succession was of great symbolic and practical 
meaning. Al-Ţabarī’s work is full of detailed descriptions of the various conflicts that arose 
over this question. One of the most famous occurred in the year 802. According to al-Ţabarī, 
in this year the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd leads the Pilgrimage to Mecca, with a complicated 
plan for the succession of his two sons, Muḥammad al-Amīn and ‘Abdallāh b. Hārūn al-
Maʾmūn. Both are his designated heirs, and they accompany Hārūn on the Pilgrimage. In 
Medina and Mecca Hārūn gives large sums of money to the people on behalf of himself and 
the two heirs.127 Then, in Mecca, Hārūn places two letters in “the Holy House”, the Ka‘bah. 
Religious lawyers and judges have expended great intellectual efforts on the composition of 
these letters, according to Al-Ţabarī. The first letter stipulates the succession arrangements 
between Hārūn’s two sons. The second letter documents an oath of allegiance which the 
caliph has extracted from the nobles and commoners alike, in addition to the written 
obligations due to al-Maʾmūn and incumbent upon both al-Amīn and those nobles and 
commoners. In the Ka‘bah, the ritual of “the act of witness” to the two documents is enacted, 
in the presence of “God, His angels […], the rest of his [the caliph’s] children, his family, his 
mawlās, his military commanders, his ministers, his secretaries, and so forth”.128 These are 
significant people in the Islamic society, and the event literally takes place in the holiest of 
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Islamic sanctuaries, so the ritual is a momentous happening in the Islamic society. For Hārūn 
it is a means to ensure the ordered transition of power. 
Especially the document concerning the succession is of importance to al-Ţabarī. He spends 
many pages reporting the text in full and in reporting that both al-Amīn and al-Maʾmūn agree 
to what it stipulates. The main point in the document is that al-Amīn is the designated 
successor to the Caliphate, to be followed by al-Maʾmūn in due time. In addition, while al-
Amīn is Caliph, al-Maʾmūn will rule Khurasan, the eastern part of the Islamic empire. 
Another important point is that in the case of the death of both al-Amīn and al-Maʾmūn, a 
third son of Hārūn, al-Qāsim, is to inherit the caliphal title. A final point is that neither of the 
two first brothers may appoint a son before the next brother in the succession line as agreed to 
in the document.129 Hārūn’s arrangements thus put severe restrictions on the brothers. That al-
Amīn and al-Maʾmūn agree to these terms, seems to be more the result of Hārūn’s will than 
any genuine agreement between them. And according to al-Ţabarī’s description of what 
happens with the succession document does not bode well for Hārūn’s wishes: 
Then he thought it fitting to hang up the document in the Ka‘bah, but when it was lifted 
up in order to attach it for suspension, it fell down, and people commented that this 
arrangement would speedily be dissolved before it could be carried through 
completely.130 
 
And rightly so they commented – when Hārūn dies in 809, civil war soon breaks out between 
al-Amīn and al-Maʾmūn, with al-Maʾmūn as the victor in 813.131  
There are several important ideological elements in this event: lineage, the swearing of oaths 
and written documents. I will now look at these in turn, but first it is necessary to say 
something about the role of the caliph in the Islamic world. Marsham has argued that much of 
Islamic political thought on the notion of ‘kingship’ has put emphasis on its mere earthly 
power. This is in contrast to the legitimate authority of the caliphate, which is derived from 
God and in all probability was a continuation between caliphal authority and that of ancient 
Near Eastern monarchy. It is very likely that in the first centuries of Islam the caliph was held 
to be God’s representative on earth, with greater sacerdotal status and legislative power than 
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what the later Islamic traditions would allow.132 Even though al-Ţabarī wrote around 900, it is 
probably these older notions of sacred kingship that he – perhaps unwittingly – reveals 
through his descriptions. The strongest indication of this is the many descriptions of symbols 
of power: One of them includes the staff of the Prophet and the seal of the caliphate.133 
Another the Prophet’s cloak, the sword, and the parasol and then the seal ring and sceptre.134 
These are insignia of royalty, and the way al-Ţabarī include the descriptions without any 
emphasis or interest, makes a modern reader suspicious: these aspect of caliphal power were 
outmoded in al-Ţabarī’s time, but his sources have kept them, and so does he. 
But even though the caliphs’ role as mediator between God and man was on the wane, there 
are enough of other, worldly concerns to deal with in al-Ţabarī. I now turn to them. 
Ties of kinship was a basic determinant of an individual’s social standing in the Islamic 
world. Belonging to the “right” family defined more than anything one’s claim to privilege 
and special status.135 Al-Ţabarī shows how the ‘Abbasid rebellion was morally and 
theologically founded on the premise that the ‘Abbasids were rightful descendants of the 
Prophet Muhammad; theirs was to be a return to rightful rule after the people had been 
wronged by the Umayyads.136 Thus the matter of succession is of great ideological 
significance in al-Ţabarī. 
The evolution of Arabic-Islamic culture in the eighth and ninth centuries, first at the Umayyad 
and then the Abbasid court, led to both old and new ideological elements being important for 
a ruler’s power. Inheritance and bloodline were generally important in Near Eastern culture, 
and in particular in Arabian tribal culture. This evolved into the idea of the kin-group of the 
Prophet having a particular claim to the leadership of the Muslim community.137 It was not 
given that this would be so, the early Islamic community slowly developed the idea that the 
caliph must come from the tribe of Quraysh, the Prophet’s lineage. The construction of 
comprehensive Arab genealogies seems to have been the result of the tension in the early 
Islamic empire between the dominant Arab conquerors and the ethnic-linguistic groups of the 
subject peoples. The Arabs were regarded as “primitive” by the often much more cultural 
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refined subject peoples they had conquered, and so the Arabs needed to assert their claim to 
legitimate rule. They did this by arguing that they were the people to whom the Prophet had 
been sent, and that it was in the Arab language the Qur’an had been revealed.138 
What complicated the question of who could claim the caliphal title, was the tradition of 
agnatic succession, brother could inherit brother, not just a son a father. And so the caliphs’ 
sons had to deal with uncles and uncles had to deal with nephews. We see this in Al-Ţabarī’s 
descriptions of various caliphal successions. As if this is not enough, Al-Ţabarī describes how 
it matters who the mothers of the various pretenders to the caliphal title are. Even if many of 
the mothers were slaves or concubines, this did not disqualify the son; what mattered the most 
was the father. Yet, to have a mother with royal lineage was advantageous. We see this in al-
Ţabarī’s descriptions of the events related to Hārūn’s succession arrangements. The mother of 
Muḥammad al-Amīn was Zubaydah. She one of the four free wives of Hārūn, and the 
granddaughter of the Caliph Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr.139 She was thus of royal lineage. This is 
probably why Hārūn designated al-Amīn his first heir. ‘Abdallāh b. Hārūn al-Maʾmūn’s 
mother was the slave concubine, Marājil,140 and even though she seems to have been the 
daughter of a Persian nobleman from Khurasan, she was not an Arab.141 The mother of the 
third brother, al-Qāsim al-Muʾtaman, was a slave concubine called Qaṣif.142 
That the lineage of the mother was important to Abbasid ideology is confirmed in other parts 
of al-Ţabarī, for example in the letters between the caliph al-Manṣūr (754-775) and 
Muḥammad b. ͑Abdallāh, debating legitimacy. Muḥammad and his family are the descendants 
of Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter, but the caliph does not recognize Muḥammad’s kinship 
with the Prophet through a woman.143 
In addition to heredity, the Arab tribal customs of acclamation and election by the ‘people’ 
through the oath of allegiance were necessary.144 The caliph was not appointed by divine 
decision, but the ruler and subjects were connected to each other by a promise of loyalty.145 A 
development that was new to the developing Islamic empire, was the articulation of caliphal 
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power through literacy, managed by a bureaucracy of ideologues and jurists. Through the 
cultural fusion with both the Roman and the Persian worlds they had conquered, the Arabs’ 
tribal customs evolved into a fully imperial ceremonial in the 8th and 9th centuries.146 
Hārūn’s efforts in 802 was not the first time that a caliph tried to ensure the succession by 
oaths and written documents. Al-Ţabarī describes how the first ‘Abbasid caliph, al-Saffāh has 
the oath taken to his brother, al-Manṣūr. Another brother, ʿῙsā b. Mūsā, gets it as al-Manṣūr’s 
successor, and then: “The Caliph recorded the deed of these appointments in a document, 
placed it in a container, sealed it with his own seal and the seals of his family, and entrusted it 
to 'Isa b. Musa.”147 At the same time, the status of documents was not absolute.  
Al-Ţabarī relates in great detail the political and military events of the conflict, but of 
particular interest is where he describes how al-Amīn tears up the signed letters that his father 
deposited in Mecca.148 This leads the Governor of Mecca to be displeased by al-Amīn’s 
actions and to denounce him.149 This is only the beginning, and is an important reason why al-
Amīn loses the caliphate: “[…] the flagrant breach of a sworn oath had tarnished his caliphate 
irrevocably.”150 
Al-Amīn tore up the letters that his father had placed in Mecca, and this ruined his ideological 
power, according to al-Ţabarī. However, there are other instances in al-Ţabarī where 
documents are not so revered, as the following two examples show: In 762, a legal scholar is 
asked by one of the opponents of caliph Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr about the oath sworn to the 
caliph. The scholar answers: “You gave the oath of allegiance only under compulsion. A 
sworn contract is not incumbent upon anyone who has been coerced.”151 Which of course 
leads to the question of what coercion means in a given situation – in al-Ţabarī there are many 
events where the dominant factor is physical power, and where the weaker part really has no 
choice but to appear loyal. On the other hand, the scholar’s answer opens up the possibility 
that anyone who can claim coercion was involved, can withdraw their oath later. The second 
example of the uncertain role of oaths comes from the reign of the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd 
(786-809). During a conflict with Yaḥyā b. ‘Abdallāh al-‘Alawī, a member of the ‘Alid 
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family, the caliph has given a written guarantee of safe conduct to Yaḥyā, but now he wants to 
repudiate it. He asks two scholars in turn about whether the guarantee is legally valid. The 
first one, a religious lawyer, confirms the legality of the guarantee. The caliph is furious, and 
asks the second scholar, a judge, for his opinion. The answer: “This is invalid on such-and-
such counts”, pleases the caliph who replies: “You are the supreme judge [qāḍī al-quḍāt], and 
you are the person most knowledgeable about that”. The caliph then tears up the guarantee 
and the judge spits on it.  
This at least shows that there were different conceptions of written agreements. We see that 
even legal documents regarding succession which were placed in Mecca, were not in the end 
respected.152 The episode is also very interesting in that it shows the emerging role of the 
Islamic scholars; that the caliph asks for their advice is illuminating: who has supreme 
authority in this situation? The scholars or the caliph? 
There has been debate over what the realities were behind the succession arrangements of 
Hārūn that al-Ţabarī describes here. It may be that the caliph simply designated a line of two 
successors, and never set up the territorial division where Khurasan would be controlled by al-
Maʾmūn. According to this view, it was first after the defeat of al-Amīn that al-Maʾmūn’s 
propaganda altered the document.153 Whatever the specific realities were, the matter of 
genealogy was crucial in the Islamic society, and we see how this is reflected in al-Ţabarī.  
The fact that the oaths were confirmed in Mecca, and that both the witness ceremony and the 
placing of documents took place in the Ka‘bah, shows how Hārūn used symbols associated 
with the Islamic faith to reinforce the ideology of the caliph. The event in Mecca in 802 that 
al-Ţabarī describes is therefore heavily laden with ideological power, both religious and 
secular. 
Ideology must be organized in concrete forms to be relevant to the life of a community. Mann 
calls this ideological organization and argues that it comes in two main types: one that 
confirms the cohesion, the confidence, and the power of an already established social group. 
Mann calls this immanent ideology: it confirms and strengthens whatever exists.154 The other 
type is what Mann calls sociospatially transcendent. This second type transcends already 
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existing power structures and generates what Mann terms a ‘sacred’ form of authority. It is 
important in causing societal change.155 
The descriptions that I have analyzed above, show this in practice, and reveal differences 
between Theophanes and Al-Ţabarī. 
Ideological power is well established in the Byzantine world Theophanes portrays; it is new 
and in the process of becoming established in al-Ţabarī’s text. Let us see how. 
The Byzantine world was a culture with ancient roots and well-established traditions in 
Theophanes’ time. We see this reflected in his descriptions of ceremonies and their use of 
particular physical spaces. This is Mann’s immanent ideology. It confirms and strengthens the 
empire. The capitol is the prime example: Constantiople was an ancient city by Theophanes’ 
time. It had been the capitol of the Byzantine empire for centuries. Its nexus of the Imperial 
Palace, the Hippodrome, and the various churches, in particular Hagia Sophia is where 
everything of ideological importance finds a very expressive focus. In addition, the city walls 
function literally as a protecting framework around the empire’s kernel of ritual, state 
symbolism and glory.156 The ruler who controls all this, controls the Byzantine empire’s 
ideological power. 
Al-Ţabarī’s descriptions reveal a different situation in the Islamic empire. Here important 
ideological events take place in the rulers’ tents, in palaces outside of cities, in two different 
capitols, first Damascus and then Baghdad. Below, in the section on political power, we will 
see how the city of Kūfah also mattered. In addition there is the importance of Medina and 
Mecca. We see this in Hārūn’s effort to use these two cities and “the Holy House”, the 
Ka‘bah, as a basis for securing the succession he wants. The problem for the caliphs is 
twofold: the vastness and newness of the Islamic empire. It is simply too large to control in 
the same way the emperors control their territory and the capitol of Constantinople. The 
caliphs do not have the same control. What the caliphs do have, on the other hand, is a 
religion that brings something new to the ancient regions they conquer. Al-Ţabarī’s text is full 
of conflicts over theological and dynastic questions, but it is also clear from his descriptions 
that he regards the ideological power of the caliphs as crucial for their ability to rule. The 
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sermons, swearing of oaths, and the writing and signing of documents, all this is to establish 
ideological power. It is possible to see the important role of the new faith in this: It can be 
seen as an example of Mann’s immanent ideology: How Islam reinforced the Arabic culture. 
And once established, this reinforcement gathered in force. I will argue that it is a developed 
phase of this immanence we see reflected in al-Ţabarī, but not fully: the ideological power he 
describes has not found a final form; maybe it never did, considering the divisions in the 
Islamic world that still exist. 
To sum up: the ideological category contains many of the important aspects of power that a 
Byzantine or Islamic ruler could wield. Perhaps the most crucial one was the relationship 
between the divine and the temporal kingship. This was a perennial problem for the earthly 
rulers in the Abrahamic cultures. See Crone, Marsham and Rizvi for general discussions on 
this subject.157 We see this reflected in Theophanes and al-Ţabarī, both describe the rather 
disappointing situations in this world, where supposedly divine power vested in emperors or 
caliphs manifests itself in one squalid and sordid situation after another. This is a far cry from 
what Mann calls a “transcendent vision” of social authority, and where human beings are 
united through the claim that they possess “ultimately meaningful, often divinely granted, 
common qualities”.158 Mann thus highlights the tension in the ideological worldviews of 
Theophanes and al-Ţabarī. 
 
4.2 Political 
In this section I look at the political power of empress Irene, and the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd, 
respectively. The events are of different types – in the case of Irene, her arranging the Second 
Council of Nicaea; in Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Saffāh’s case, his speech to the people in Kūfah, 
where he puts forward the ‘Abbasid claim of being the rightful heirs to the Prophet 
Muhammad and thus the Caliphate. 
Both events have important religious aspects, but they are of political significance as well. I 
will use them as examples of political power in the present analysis, although they could also 
be used to highlight theological/ideological power. I will sometimes point out where the two 
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types of aspects conflate and diverge, but mainly what follows is an analysis of the political 
aspects of the events. 
 
Irene and the Second Council of Nicaea: 
In the year 780 Irene “together with her son Constantine were miraculously entrusted by God 
with the Empire”, according to Theophanes.159 Irene’s husband Leo IV had been a staunch 
iconoclast, whereas Irene was an iconophile.160 As Constantine is a young boy, Irene reigns 
on his behalf. She quickly allows the worship of icons to take place in the empire: 
From that time on the pious began to speak freely. God's word spread about, those who 
sought salvation were able to renounce the world without hindrance, God's praises rose 
up to heaven, the monasteries recovered, and all good things were manifested. 161 
 
After spending some time consolidating her power,162 Irene announces the need for an 
ecumenical council. She sets this in motion through the patriarch Paul, who has so far 
belonged to the iconoclast faction. Now he has fallen ill, and taken refuge in a monastery, 
without informing Irene. She goes to see him and reproofs him. Paul replies with tears and 
says, “Would that I had not sat at all on the throne of priesthood while God's Church was 
suffering oppression, separated as she was from the other catholic thrones and subject to 
anathema.”.163 This statement is interesting not only from a theological perspective, but even 
more from a political one: the ban on images was particular for the Byzantine church, it was 
not accepted in the Western church, nor in the various Eastern churches in the territories 
under Muslim control. Since the time of Constantine the Great, theological disputes between 
the various churches in the Roman empire had made political unity increasingly difficult. The 
problem was made worse after the collapse of the western part of the Roman empire. Then the 
Arab conquests in the seventh century made the already weak relations between 
Constantinople and the various Eastern churches even more tenuous.164 In Theophanes’ text it 
may be that Paul speaks like he does because he knows that Irene is looking for a 
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reconciliation with the other churches: it is not unlikely that she had ambitions to create a 
greater unity between West and East. At least between the Latin West and the Byzantine 
empire. How much she or the other Byzantine emperors believed in a reconquest of the 
former Byzantine regions under Muslim control, is hard to know. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to ascertain whether Theophanes is concerned with the political aspects of the events 
he describes here. As we see in so many instances in his chronicle, one may infer that 
Theophanes was aware of political matters, but on the surface, it is the theological 
perspectives that dominate. 
After speaking to Paul, Irene summons the patricians and the chief men of the Senate to hear 
Paul’s words. He repeats his anger and says that “Unless an ecumenical council takes place 
and the error that is in your midst is corrected, you will not find salvation”.165 Paul dies, and 
Irene names a new patriarch. All the details of this need not concern us here, but when 
Theophanes writes about the new patriarch’s theological qualms in accepting the position it is 
hard to escape the feeling that this is mere posturing. In the end both the patriarch and a host 
of prominent people that Irene has gathered in the Great Palace in Constantinople all agree 
that a synod should be held.166 The new patriarch sends his synodic letter and his declaration 
of faith to Rome, for recognition by the Pope. Irene sends word to the Pope “asking him to 
dispatch letters and emissaries to be present at the synod”.167 
In August of 786, the synod begins in the Church of the Holy Apostles in Constantinople. The 
proceedings are interrupted by army units and bishops opposed to Irene’s policies. The synod 
is dissolved.168 Irene has seemingly lost control, even in the Imperial city. 
The next month, Irene manages, in concert with loyal military units, to take control over 
Constantinople. She forces the hostile parts of the army to deliver up their arms, and then she 
exiles them from the City; she bids them to go back to their native land. She then forms “her 
own army” with officers obedient to her. Then she convenes the synod again, this time in the 
city of Nicaea, in 787. It is now held successfully, with representatives from Rome and the 
East present. A good omen reinforces the success: “[…] a considerable eclipse of the sun took 
place at the 5th hour of the day while holy liturgy was being performed”.169 Then the synod is 
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ended in Constantinople itself, with “everyone” present in the Imperial Palace, where the 
decree is read out and signed by Constantine VI and his mother. “And so God's Church found 
peace, even though the Enemy does not cease from sowing his tares among his own 
workmen; but God's Church when she is under attack always proves victorious.” 170 Irene thus 
seems to have won over her political enemies in Constantinople and the empire. 
Irene’s position in relation to the West, the Pope in Rome and Charlemagne as a 
Western emperor, however, is more troubled. For modern historians, the Byzantine 
emperors’ relationship with the West in general is difficult to ascertain. Were the two 
ancient parts of the Roman empire two different political bodies or were they still two 
parts of the same political body?171 In Theophanes’ descriptions it seems that a practical 
division was well established, but Irene’s (and other emperors’) formal overtures to the 
Pope and Charlemagne indicate a more complex relationship. What is certain is that 
after the “Treaty”172 of Achen in 812, the Byzantine court at least half-heartedly 
recognized Charlemagne as ‘imperator et basileus’.173 It is also interesting to note that 
before this period, the Byzantine emperors in their official correspondence used the 
term ‘from the emperor of Christendom’. After Charlemagne’s coronation as Western 
Roman Emperor, the Byzantine emperors almost always added the term ‘romaion’ to 
the title “emperor’. Even though the Byzantine emperors had always considered 
themselves ‘the Emperor of the Romans’ it seems that the need to affirm the title 
became acute after 812.174 Further elaboration of this point is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but it highlights the difficult relationship between the Byzantine emperors and 
the West. Theophanes writes without commenting on this complex state of affairs, and 
one is left to wonder why. Did he consider the West still a part of the Roman empire, or 
does his text reflect a notion that the West already constituted a separate political entity? 
What is clear from his depiction of Irene’s dealings with the Pope and with 
Charlemagne, is that her political/diplomatic power is limited. 
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A final point can underline the argument for considering the council as an important political 
event: When Iconoclasm was finally reversed as official theology by the empress Theodora in 
843, she did this not by convening another council of bishops in a church. Instead she 
arranged an assembly of selected officials and clerics in the private house of the postal 
logothete Theocistus, and in this house Iconoclasm was condemned simply by accepting the 
Second Council of Nicaea.175 For all that Theocistus was a close advisor to the empress and a 
high official at the Byzantine court, this way of dealing with a theological question seems 
mundane. As a way of solving a political problem it is more appropriate. 
 
The sermon of Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Saffāh 
Al-Saffāh was the first ‘Abbasid Caliph. With him, a new dynasty ruled the Islamic world, 
and that it turned out so, was foretold by the Prophet himself, according to al-Ṭabarī176. On 
the day the people of Kūfah swore allegiance to him, al-Saffāh held a sermon in the city’s 
mosque. There he claimed that the Prophet Muhammad’s uncle, al-ʿAbbās b. ʿAbd al-
Muṭṭalib, had been informed by Muhammad that he would pass the caliphate to al-Abbas’ 
descendants. Al-Saffāh claims to be this descendant, and he claims the caliphate on behalf of 
the ‘Abbasid branch of the Prophet’s family. A dynastic claim is here put forward in a 
religious setting, and thus merges the two roles of the caliph: religious and secular ruler. The 
claim itself is religiously based: descendance from the Prophet’s family, al-Saffāh is a 
descendant of the Prophet’s uncle. Still, as we see below, the religious setting cannot hide the 
political aspect of the event.  
Al-Saffāh asserts this claim from the minbar/mosque in Kūfah. Al-Ṭabarī reports the sermon 
in full, using several pages to do so.177 After an initial praising of God, al-Saffāh goes on to 
say: 
He created us from the ancestors of the Prophet, causing us to grow from his tree, and be 
derived thereby from common origins, making him one of us, causing what distresses us 
to weigh heavy on him, and making him watchful over us, for with the faithful He is 
gentle, compassionate.178 
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The ‘Abbasid rebellion is thus a return to rightful rule; the Muslim community has been 
wronged by the Umayyads.179 Especially the people of Kūfah have been aware of this: 
People of Kūfah, you are the halting-place of our love, the lodging of our affections. You 
it is who remained steadfast, you who were not deflected from our love by the injustice of 
the people of tyranny against you until you reached our epoch and God brought you our 
revolution.180 
 
Now, this praise of the people of Kūfah is clearly political. The ‘Abbasid claim to the 
caliphate was not obvious as is clear from al-Ţabarī. The ‘Abbasids were partly allied with the 
‘Alids, the proto-Shiites. A political interpretation is confirmed by the next part of the sermon, 
where al-Saffāh shows his generosity to the people of Kūfah: 
You of all mankind are most fortunate in us and most worthy of our generosity. We have 
increased your allowances to a hundred dirhams. Make ready, then; for I am the manifest 
Spiller (Saffāh), the desolating Avenger.181 
 
It is good to have divine approval, but some hard cash seems to have been necessary as well 
to ensure the audience’s loyalty. The sobriquet Saffāh can mean either spiller of wealth or 
spiller of blood182: so either a generous ruler or an implacable one. Whether the statement was 
meant as a promise or a threat is hard to tell, possibly it was both. Al-Saffāh is by now 
exhausted with fever, and his uncle, Dāwud b. ‘Alī takes over the sermon, standing modestly 
below al-Saffāh on the minbar. Dāwud continues, denigrating the Umayyads while praising 
the people of Kūfah. In addition Dāwud mentions ‘our cousins’: “What made us rebel was the 
shame of their taking away our rights, our anger for our cousins, our grief for your affairs and 
the burden that oppressed us for your sakes.”183 The ‘cousins’ are the ‘Alids, but this 
professing to avenge the wrongs committed against kinsmen is a hollow claim; in reality the 
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‘Abbasids denied the ‘Alids any prior right to rule.184 That the ‘Abbasids had no intention to 
support the ‘Alids is confirmed at the end of the sermon, when Dāwud states: “So know that 
the authority is with us, and shall not depart from us until we surrender it to Jesus the son of 
Mary.”185 This is politics veiled in religious language: in Dāwud’s telling, the ‘Abbasids’ 
reign is to last until the Messianic age which will precede the end of the world. A Sunni 
hadith says that “There will be no Mahdī but Jesus”. Dāwud thus excludes the ‘Alid sects and 
their hadiths which state that a Mahdī of the line of Ali will fulfill the Messianic rule of 
justice. In reality Dāwud here rejects the ‘Alid claim and suggests that it is the ‘Abbasids who 
will usher in a second messianic age and the second coming of Jesus.186 When the sermon is 
over, Al-Saffāh receives “the handclasp of allegiance” from the people, and this marks the 
beginning of his role as caliph.187 
As is his method, Al-Ṭabarī describes this event from other sources as well. Another version 
is more prosaic: Al-Saffāh enters the mosque from the governor’s palace and goes up into the 
minbar. He then praises God and the excellence of the Prophet before tracing authority to rule 
and the succession to the Prophet down to himself. He promises the people good times to 
come and then he stops talking.188 Dāwud, who is three steps lower in the minbar, continues 
on al-Saffāh’s behalf. In this version, al-Ṭabarī reports the following:  
He praised God and glorified Him and spoke benedictions on the Prophet. Then he said, 
“Ye people, truly there has been no Caliph after God’s Messenger save ‘Alī b. Abī Tālib 
and this Commander of the Faithful who now sits behind me.” Abū al-‘Abbās then came 
down and left.189 
 
This version is more prosaic but contains the same core elements. Al-Ṭabarī describes an 
important political event, taking place in a religious setting and being expressed in a religious 
language. This was usual for Islamic sermons; they had an official character: “They contained 
exhortations, not theoretical teachings; the khaṭīb was an orator, not a theologian.”190 
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Al-Ṭabarī’s work reflects this – again and again he describes various sermons and speeches of 
this kind; often he includes the actual words. 
We saw above that Mann defines political power to consist of two means. The first is 
“territorial centralization”, where dominant social groups, in pursuit of their goals, “require 
social regulation over a confined, bounded territory”.191 This the Byzantines managed to do, 
but only after the huge territorial losses in the seventh century. After this consolidation of 
their geographical control, the Byzantine rulers seem to have exercised a fair deal of ‘social 
regulation’ in the Byzantine state. This is reflected in Theophanes. The caliphs, on the other 
hand, struggle much more with this social regulation of their state. The Muslim conquests of 
much of the Roman empire and all of the Iranian empire, was crucial for the formation of 
Islamic political culture. The origins of Islamic political culture lay on the remote margins of 
the late antique Roman and Persian cultures, but its development took place at the center of 
these two older cultures.192 This development was not without problems, the caliphs struggled 
with developing control over the vast territories that the Islamic empire spanned. We see this 
reflected in al-Ţabarī, where the caliphs repeatedly strive to control the many factions and 
areas that their empire contain. 
This difference can also be seen in Mann’s second means of political power, “geopolitical 
diplomacy”. This is closely related to my diplomatic sub-category and is relevant to how 
Theophanes and al-Ţabarī describe diplomatic affairs. In this, the two writers portray different 
situations for the rulers’ wielding of diplomatic power. Theophanes describes many different 
situations where the emperors engage in diplomatic relations with the Pope in Rome, various 
kings in the Latin west, the Bulgar khans, and the various Islamic caliphs. Al-Ṭabarī does not 
describe diplomatic relations in the same manner. There are descriptions of contact between 
the caliphs and the Byzantine emperors, and between the caliphs and potentates in the eastern 
parts of the Caliphate. However, al-Ṭabarī is also concerned with “diplomatic” relations 
between the various factions and regions inside the Islamic empire. It plays out just like 
relations between independent polities, even though the participants are nominally part of the 
same political entity. This aspect of political power reflects the vastness of the Islamic empire 
and its tenuous coherence. 
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In the following I have used several of Theophanes’ descriptions of Byzantine military 
activity, not one in particular. I do the same with Al-Ṭabarī’s descriptions of the caliphs’ 
military power. There are multitudes to pick from, and the ones below are typical examples. 
The emperors at war 
In February 811, the emperor Nikephoros attacks the Bulgarians. The campaign is disastrous, 
there is animosity and division between the emperor and large parts of his army, and it all 
ends horribly for the Byzantines: in July the army is wiped out.193 Theophanes writes: “Before 
day-break the barbarians fell on the tent of Nikephoros and those of his commanders and slew 
him miserably.” Then all the other high dignitaries in the Byzantine army are killed. It is a day 
“for which no lamentation is adequate”.194 The Bulgarian leader, Kroummos cuts off the head 
of Nikephoros and hangs it on a pole for exhibition. Later Kroummos uses the skull as a 
drinking vessel, and he forces the other chieftains of the “Sklavinians” to drink from it.195 
This is a brutal episode in Byzantine military history, but it is one of many that Theophanes 
describes in the centuries he deals with. Yet in spite of all the many losses, and some 
victories, the empire managed to survive. This seems to have been not because of the military 
proficiency of the emperors, but more due to the resilience of the Byzantine state system. 
As a result of the Avar and Slavic conquests in the Balkans and the Arab conquests in the 
Africa, Egypt, and Syria during the seventh and eighth centuries, the Byzantine Empire was 
considerably reduced in territory, people, and wealth by the turn of the eighth century. With 
the massive loss of territory followed a new situation with regards to territorial boundaries. 
The old frontiers had been clearly established, in spite of continuous conflicts with both the 
Slavic tribes in the Balkans and the Persians in Mesopotamia. The new frontiers were 
different – less defined and without possible allied frontier troops, the limitanei. The 
Byzantine army had to defend borders much closer to the capitol, Constantinople, and with far 
fewer resources. That they often managed to do this, speaks for the strength of the Byzantine 
state, in spite of all the setbacks. By the early eighth century the worst perils of the empire 
were past. The Arab siege of Constantinople in 718 had failed, and the empire was no longer 
fighting for its life. Internally the ending of the revolt of Artabasdos in 743, initiated a 
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measure of political stability. The Roman army had been reorganized in the seventh century. 
This resulted in an improvement of the army, and it was by this time able to defeat the Bulgar 
army about half the time and even the Arab armies from time to time.196 
The role of the emperors in military affairs varies in Theophanes’ text. Some participate 
actively on campaigns; others leave more to their generals. We have seen above how 
Nikephoros loses both his life and an army. How could it go so badly? Theophanes’ other 
descriptions of Nikephoros highlight what military power an emperor could exercise. 
In 811 Nikephoros had been emperor for nine years. He ousted the popular empress Irene to 
achieve the throne, and Theophanes is thus no admirer: “All the populace of the City gathered 
together and everyone was displeased by what was happening and cursed both him who was 
crowning and him who was being crowned and those who approved of these actions.”197 So it 
all starts badly, and Nikephoros’ military activities in these years that follow do not improve 
his status. In 806 Nikephoros loses to the Arabs: he is frightened, perplexed and he despairs; 
he must accept a peace and he must pay tribute. Then Nikephoros breaks the treaty, with the 
result that Arab forces attacks again and wreak havoc on the Byzantines.198 
The next year, the emperor makes a military expedition against the Bulgars that achieves 
nothing. Nikephoros returns in haste to Constantinople to avert a revolt by parts of the army 
and imperial officials: “When he had come to Adrianople, he became aware that a revolt 
against him was being planned by imperial officials and by the tagmata”. He punishes his 
opponents with scourging, exile, and confiscation.199 Theophanes does not state the reasons 
for the revolt, but from the descriptions of Nikephoros’ general unpopularity, it can be 
inferred that powerful men want the emperor gone or dead. In 809 Nikephoros fails yet again 
in a military campaign against the Bulgars. A part of the army is massacred, but the emperor 
refuses a promise of immunity (from allegations of neglect of duty) to officers who escaped 
the massacre. The officers then flee to the Bulgarians.200 Here it sounds like the emperor is 
too harsh, but it could be that he has his grounds. It would not be the first time a ruler was 
betrayed from inside.201 As if this situation is not bad enough, Nikephoros swears a sacred 
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oath to the nobles at court in Constantinople to the effect that he has celebrated Easter in the 
court of the Bulgarian leader Kroummos – supposedly meaning that he has conquered the 
Bulgars.202 
Theophanes has more to say on the emperor, but by now it is clear that Nikephoros in 
Theophanes’ estimate is a morally flawed person, a liar, and a cheat. He is also militarily 
incompetent, with disastrous results because of it.  
It may be that Theophanes’ portrait of the emperor is unjust, because of Nikephoros’ 
iconoclastic views, but if we compare with Theophanes’ descriptions of Constantine V, it is 
apparent that it is not the theological views that determine the military success of an emperor. 
Constantine is successful against his domestic opponents, the Bulgars and the Arabs; not all 
the time, but enough to secure the empire’s borders. How successful he is considered, 
becomes clear from Theophanes’ description of the emperor Michael I Rangabe, who 
succeeded Nikephoros in 811. Michael is an iconophile, and should be blessed, according to 
Theophanes’ theology. But along with the imperial throne, Michael also inherited the 
Bulgarian Kroummos as an enemy and fares no better against him than Nikephoros did. In 
Constantinople opponents of Michael, take up arms to “subvert the orthodox faith”. They call 
for Iconoclasm, as in the days of Constantine V: he at least, was successful against the 
Bulgarians, they say, so perhaps Iconoclasm isn’t so bad after all? they ask. Michael manages 
to quell this revolt, but even though the insurgents are arrested, the admiration for Constantine 
V and Iconoclasm is a large problem for Michael.203 As I have stated above, this frank 
reporting of events that clearly contradicts his religious beliefs, makes Theophanes a better 
historian. 
We have seen what happens to an emperor who loses battles, he faces unpopularity or revolt 
at  home, and death abroad. But what about successful emperors? How are they received in 
the Byzantine society, apart from general popularity? As with the acclamation and crowning 
ceremonies that we have already looked at, the celebration of military victory had its own 
ritual. Theophanes describes both Constantine V, Leo IV, and Irene’s successes. 
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Constantine V goes to war against the Bulgarians again, and this time he wins a great victory; 
he celebrates “a triumph in the City”.204 
Leo IV leads a successful campaign against the Arabs. Celebrates a triumph in 
Constantinople.205 
Irene’s forces under the patrician and logothete Staurakios beat the Sklavininan tribes in 
Thessalonica and Hellas and the Peloponnese. In January, a victory is celebrated for 
Staurakios during the Hippodrome games. In May Irene herself, with Constantine, leads a 
military expedition to Thrace; she orders the city of Beroia rebuilt and renames it 
Eirenoupolis.206 
The various rituals in Constantinople that are enacted after a military victory, follow many of 
the same patterns we saw in relation with succession and crowning. There is the parading in 
the streets, ceremonies in the Imperial Palace, in the Hippodrome, and in Hagia Sophia. This 
points to an affirmation of imperial ideology through the celebration of military power. 
 
The caliphs at war 
In spite of the impressive military successes of the Islamic armies, none of the caliphs seem to 
have been great generals. A striking feature of al-Ṭabarī’s history is how much of the military 
leadership in the Islamic state is conducted by generals, not sovereigns. The caliphs 
participate in military campaigns, but their role in military affairs seems to have been more 
delegative and strategic than direct and tactical. 
Al-Saffāh, the founder of the Abbasid caliphate, developed a strained relationship with his 
most successful general Abū Muslim. The growing conflict between al-Saffāh and Abū 
Muslim is a good example of how weak a caliph actually could be in military affairs.207 The 
next caliph, al-Manṣūr, has Abū Muslim killed covertly, and even then, or precisely because 
of the murder, the caliph’s position is not secure – he is afraid of what the people loyal to Abū 
Muslim would do. This event shows how weak al-Manṣūr’s position is – he has to hide the 
dead body in a carpet and throw it in the Tigris river!208 At the same time, al-Manṣūr is later 
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described as a “lion” in battle.209 His personal bravery is not questioned by al-Ṭabarī, it is the 
generalship that is lacking. 
Still, military matters and leadership was of great importance to the caliphs. In addition to 
being “supreme commanders”, the caliphs made sure to groom heirs and close family 
members for military participation in control of the empire. Princes and members of the 
‘Abbasid family were often sent to the provinces on military campaigns, either as 
commanders of armies or as officers. This gave them military experience and gave them the 
chance to get to know important military commanders.210 In addition, accompanying the 
armies were administrators from the court, often future high officials. It was thus a way to 
make political friendships and to build political networks. The ‘Abbasid princes could also 
acquire a more general knowledge of the different parts of the Islamic empire and the 
populace. Military life could therefore be important for a young man in the ‘Abbasid family, 
whether he was destined for the caliphate itself, or a high position in the empire. 
In Al-Ţabarī’s descriptions of the military events in 780, we see several of these 
characteristics. First, the caliph al-Hādī orders all the armies of the people of Khurāsān and 
others to furnish troops for the “summer expedition”. He spends two months drawing up the 
army, preparing and paying the troops. The members of his family who set out with him, 
receive gifts.211 More detailed descriptions follow, but the whole campaign seems ritualistic in 
Al-Ţabarī’s version. In addition to his own campaign in the east, the caliph appoints his son, 
Hārūn al-Rashīd, the heir apparent, to lead a summer expedition against the Byzantines. Al-
Hādī sends Yaḥyā b. Khālid b. Barmak with Hārūn: “He sent with him al-Ḥasan and 
Sulaymān, sons of Barmak, and he sent Yaḥyā b. Khālid with him in charge of the 
administration of the army, his expenses, his secretariat, and the managing of his affairs, and 
all Hārūn’s business was in his hands. Al-Rabī ͑ the Chamberlain was appointed with Hārūn to 
go on the raid on behalf of al-Mahdī, and (the differences) between al-Rabī ͑ and Yaḥyā were 
on account of that.”212 Through al-Ţabarī’s words we get a glimpse of the personal relations 
between the ‘Abbasids and their various advisors – it is a very human portrait, not one of 
great military deeds. Al-Ţabarī even includes an episode that occurs at the start of the 
Byzantine campaign. Here the young Hārūn is out playing polo and is laughed derisively at by 
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two of his followers. So much for respect for “the son of the Commander of the Faithful”!213 
The campaign itself is described briefly, a few weeks of campaigning and then the army 
returns: “Hārūn returned safely with the Muslims, except those who had been killed or 
wounded there.”214 
Al-Ţabarī describes many battles in the east in much greater detail than against the Byzantines 
in the west215, but what is interesting for my analysis is the fact that the caliphs are not 
portrayed by al-Ţabarī as great military leaders. Why is that? After all, the pursuit of holy war 
was an important sign of leadership in the Muslim community.216 Particularly the border 
between the Byzantine empire and the Islamic empire under the Umayyads took on a 
particular role in the Muslim understanding of war. The Greeks were the ancient foe and to 
wage war against them was the classic Jihād – war against the infidels. The Prophet himself 
had sent expeditions against them. The leadership of these campaigns was thus a sign of 
sovereignty, equal to the leadership of the Pilgrimage to Mecca.217 Under the Umayyads, this 
border was also a means to personal salvation – the volunteer soldiers fighting here had a 
special status. Regular soldiers served, but volunteers that engaged in jihād added to warfare 
devotional exercises and ascetic practises. Holy War in this area was “the monasticism of 
Islam”.218 With the coming of the ‘Abbasids, interest in persons seeking salvation on the 
border waned,219 but the ritualistic warfare against the Byzantines continued almost every 
year under the ‘Abbasids. Hārūn used the perpetual warfare consciously to develop his role as 
leader of the Muslim community.220 Al-Ţabarī  writes: “He adopted a cap [qalansuwah] on 
which was written the words “Warrior for the faith, Pilgrim”, and used to wear this.” 221 
And yet, in spite of the pervasive theme of military affairs, great military leadership is not 
something that al-Ţabarī conveys. Instead, we are left with the impression of an empire partly 
outside the caliph’s control. Enormous distances, political factions, regional autonomy, and 
cultural differences seem to intrude on the military power of every one of the caliphs that al-
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Ţabarī writes about. The caliphs of al-Ţabarī were human beings at the centre of a vast social-
political construct that in a sense diminished the military role of one single commander. 
In reading Theophanes and al-Ţabarī, a modern reader might wonder at what they do not 
include on military matters. There are no real descriptions of the following: tactics and 
strategy; weapons and military equipment; the organizing and equipping of the army and 
navy. Nor is there much on military ideology, apart from the ambition of winning. 
That the Byzantines did think about these matters is clear from the many treatises on military 
affairs that were written during the Byzantine period.222 Theophanes includes little of this in 
his work, and so the reader is left with his general remarks. The Arab sources are not very 
accommodating in this regard either, the early Islamic historians are “more interested in 
individuals than in institutions”,223 and al-Ţabarī is no different in this regard. 
The descriptions of the rulers as leaders in war differ slightly in Theophanes and al-Ţabarī – 
in that the Greek text is short and does not say much about the details of the rulers nor of their 
generals, whereas the Arabic text goes into great detail in describing the minutiae of battle 
and the thoughts of both caliphs and generals during battle. So we do not get much 
information about specifics – but both Theophanes and al-Ţabarī seem to expect the same 
from a ruler in matters related to military conflict: the ruler must be successful in war, he must 
be popular with the troops, and he has to have their trust, and finally he must be an honorable 
person in the sense that he cannot betray his own people or lie to them. These are means for 
success in war that are fairly generic to most of human history. 
Another aspect of the rulers’ war power is perhaps the most important issue of all: the 
justification for war – why does society go to war – but it is not discussed except that it is 
God’s will. Theophanes invokes God throughout his work, and this seems to be his 
justification for the Byzantines’ war. This is perhaps not so strange, as the large territorial 
losses in the seventh century, the East Roman empire became increasingly threatened and 
beleaguered. Its struggle for survival became a battle between Christianity and its enemies – 
good versus evil. In a sense, all wars were now holy wars – the Chosen People of the 
Christian God was under threat.224 Theophanes’ religious language infuses his whole work, 
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and so fits well with this perspective. In al-Ţabarī the religious justification is equally 
important, but there are no further reflections. 
To sum up the use of Mann’s military category on the Byzantine rulers: The role of the 
emperor seems to be crucial for military expansion and success; the state can shore up the 
failure of a weak emperor – the state organization is resilient enough to withstand severe 
losses. And in the end, the massive walls of the capitol, Constantinople, saves the empire’s 
kernel again and again. 
The control of military power is more varied in the Islamic context than the Byzantine. None 
of the caliphs led an army in the field in a large-scale campaign, their military control was 
instead conducted through various generals. To a certain degree this was the case in the 
Byzantine empire, but here the emperors at least followed the armies in the field, and in 
Theophanes’ descriptions they definitively come across as actual military leaders in many 
instances. Still, I have used the same categorization for military control in the tables below – 
both emperors and caliphs were in the end the wielders of military powers in their respective 
domains. To the extent that generals and other commanders rebelled, this was a similar 
problem for both emperor and caliph. 
The caliphs ruled over a vast empire. Minor or large revolts seem to have been prevalent. The 
large battles that the Islamic armies fought in Khurasan, and further east are described in great 
detail by al-Ṭabarī, but the caliphs do not participate much. With some exceptions direct 
military leadership is not what the emperors or caliphs do: they are not generals. At most they 
accompany the army in the field. 
The emperor seems to have been more important as a military leader than the caliph: the 
successful emperors could reconquer and expand; the caliphate owed its military successes 
more to competent generals than caliphs. 
 
4.4 Economic 
In reading Theophanes and al-Ţabarī it is not easy to find any reflections on economy or 
economic policy. They do write about resources, money, and taxes, but this is more in the 
vein of reporting on this or that event, and particularly from a moral perspective rather than 
from any concern with fiscal policy. 






Theophanes writes with moral indignation on the taxes the various emperors introduce. He 
seems oblivious to the idea that there might be real need for the taxes, and that there is a 
rationale behind fiscal policy beyond the emperors’ personal greed. That the bureaucrats, 
military commanders, and the emperor needed to finance the army and navy to ensure the 
survival of the state, seems not to have crossed his mind. 
Al-Ţabarī is not so morally indignant, but his most interesting section regarding public 
economy is still on how a young, newly appointed governor should behave with regards to 
taxes: what is the reasonable level of taxation on the local population? And the answer is just 
as moral as it is financially utilitarian. 
Imperial economics 
In 731 the emperor Leo III, who is furious with the Pope for “the secession of Rome and 
Italy”, sends a great fleet against Rome and Italy, “under the command of Manes, strategos of 
Kibyraiots”: it is wrecked in a storm. This failure makes Leo even more furious: he imposes a 
capitation tax on one third of the population of Sicily and Calabria; he orders a tax formerly 
paid to the churches to be paid to the Public Treasury.225 Here Theophanes does not reflect on 
whether there could be more calculated reasons than anger for this tax. It is probable that this 
was not a new tax, but that Leo took direct control with taxes that up until then had been 
collected by the Church in Rome.226 Considering the strained relation between Constantinople 
and Italy, this is a more plausible reason than the one Theophanes offers. 
The emperor Constantine V is described by Theophanes as merciless toward monks and 
monasteries: “As for monasteries built to the glory of God and as a refuge to those seeking 
salvation, he turned them into common barracks for the soldiers who shared his opinions. […] 
as well as other holy habitations of monks and virgins he completely demolished:”227 In this 
case, Theophanes may be closer to the truth. Constantine V ruled as an iconoclast, and 
opposition to Iconoclasm meant opposition to Constantine. The emperor used the persecutions 
of iconophiles to bend the episcopate and bureaucracy to his will, and to confiscate 
ecclesiastical property, especially monastic property. He thus gained both politically and 
economically by this.228 What most motivated the emperor is of course difficult to say for a 
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modern reader, but Theophanes is in no doubt: from the number of invectives that he employs 
in the accompanying descriptions of Constantine’s character, the reason is pure evil and 
godlessness. 
Constantine may have had rational motives when dealing with the monasteries and churches:  
Since these institutions were legal personalities of their own, they could belong to no man.229 
This legal status made it possible for wealthy Byzantines to embed their economic interests 
and those of their heirs and descendants in the foundation document of monasteries and other 
private religious institutions. In this way Byzantine testators were able to circumvent a four-
generational limit that Justinian had placed on wills. Under cover of a pious donation the rich 
could harness the legal personality of the monastery or church, and make sure of the future 
prosperity of their household and kin. It was the Roman-Byzantine version of a “trust 
fund.”230 To stop this way of avoiding taxes may well have been the reason for the attacks on 
religious institutions described by Theophanes, in addition to theological disputes. 
But Constantine’s avarice does not stop there, according to our chronicler. The emperor “also 
at this time made commodities cheap in the City. For, like a new Midas, he stored away the 
gold and denuded the peasants who, because of the exaction of taxes, were forced to sell 
God's bounty at a low price.”231 In ordering the payment of base taxes in cash, Constantine 
got ready money232, but farmers became desperate for cash to pay their taxes, and so flooded 
the market with agricultural products and prices plummeted.233 It may have been a harsh 
means to finance the army and navy, but at least Constantine’s legacy was that he succeeded 
in protecting the empire from its enemies. Again, Theophanes does not reflect on this. 
Theophanes is happier when Constantine during a ceremony at Hagia Sophia, throws gold 
coins to the crowd outside the church.234 
It seems that Theophanes only approves of the lowering of taxes – he writes about how 
empress Irene is unpopular after her coup against her own son, and her effort to become more 
popular by lowering taxes on all imported merchandise: “In March of the 9th indiction the 
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pious Irene remitted the civic taxes for the inhabitants of Byzantium and cancelled the so-
called komerkia of Abydos and Hieron. She was greatly thanked for these and many other 
liberalities.”235 But then the emperor Nikephoros I restores the taxes eight years later, together 
with a series of taxes which affect the whole empire. Theophanes describes these actions: 
“[…] in order to indicate this man’s inventiveness in all manner of greed. […] In this year 
Nikephoros extended his designs against the Christians by way of an ungodly control over the 
purchase of all kinds of animals, cattle and produce, the unjust confiscations and fines 
imposed upon prominent persons, and the exaction of interest on ships (he who issued laws 
against usury!) and a thousand other evil inventions. To describe all of them in detail would 
appear tedious to those who seek to learn events in a succinct form.”236 
In reading Theophanes descriptions of the emperors’ economic arrangements – taxation, 
confiscations, forcible removing of peoples, etc. – one might be left with the impression of 
Byzantium as a command economy, a dirigiste state where the imperial government 
controlled all economic activity. This is far from the truth, as modern historians see it. 
Sources such as The Book of the Eparch, reveal an active commercial economy. The complex 
Romano-Byzantine commercial law, which regulated trade and commerce for many centuries, 
reveal a sophisticated commercial economy in the Byzantine world.237 During the seventh and 
eight centuries the Byzantine state seems to have control over its fiscal base and the empire’s 
resources in general.238 
We should therefore question whether Theophanes was aware of the reasons for the various 
reforms he so forcefully condemns or whether he understood them at all. On the other hand, 
he was a high-ranking official in the church in Constantinople, and in close contact with the 
court, so he could not have been unaware of the state of affairs. Perhaps his religious 
inclinations got the better of him. If so, he would not be the first or last servant of God to 
judge worldly affairs in a divine light. 
We can get an idea of the attitudes on financial matters from a sixth century treatise on 
military affairs, The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy. It was probably written by a 
retired army engineer, a man with a good knowledge of both the administrative and the 
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practical aspects of military life. His treatise starts with “the science of government”239 – 
descriptions of how the civil state works, or in his opinion, should work, before he moves on 
to specific military affairs. He uses the following headings in the three first sections on the 
civil state: “Statecraft and Its Divisions”, “The Reasons for the Various Classes in the State” 
and “Officials”. Under “Officials” he writes the following: “Coming now to the officials 
assigned to financial matters, those who assess the taxes must be just in the ways they go 
about it; they should have some knowledge of surveying, of agricultural methods, and of 
accounting.”240 He then continues, describing how these officials must be able to estimate 
“[…] the effects of climate and topography, the proximity of cities, of navigable rivers, and of 
the sea”.241 The officials collecting taxes should examine these and other relevant factors in 
assessing the taxes. The anonymous writer emphasizes that these officials should be men of 
the highest repute. They must be “[…] genuine lovers of truth, be respected for this, and place 
their hopes of being honored in the truth. They shall be skillful in investing and interpreting 
facts and be good administrators, so that the public treasury will not suffer and no injustice 
will be done to the landowners”.242 There is more advice of the same kind, but the point 
should be clear: these are down-to-earth practical attitudes on how to treat the collecting of 
taxes. It shows a concern for both the state’s interests and the landowners’ interests. What we 
have here is at least an ideal of how public officials should behave, and in spite of being 
written earlier than Theophanes’ time, it probably reflects attitudes that stayed consistent over 
the centuries. And who would say that these are not ideals to hope for in public officials in our 
own time too! What is shows, is that the Byzantine state had a good understanding of many 
aspects of financial matters. If we collate this with what we have seen in the reforms of 
various emperors, we see a sophisticated understanding of economic policy. But if we can say 
this for the Byzantine bureaucracy and the emperor, it seems that Theophanes did not 
understand much of this, or at least in his chronicle he does not. 
 
Advice to a young man – a lesson in self-improvement and how to succeed in the world 
In 822 a young man, ‘Abdallāh b. Ṭāhir, was appointed governor of Raqqah by the caliph al-
Maʾmūn. The new official was the son of al-Maʾmūn’s famous general, Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn. 
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The young man’s reputation is stellar, according to Al-Ţabarī. The caliph has heard good 
things about the general’s son, but in a meeting with him, the caliph is impressed “[…] but I 
have noted that you are actually better than your father’s description of you”.243 
When his son departs for Raqqah, Ṭāhir sends him an epistle, containing advice on how to 
rule.244 The opening lines are typical: “Let there be in you the fear of God, He who is one and 
without associate. Hold Him in awe and reverence and avert his wrath. Look after the interests 
of your subjects.”245 What follows in the many pages that al-Ţabarī cites in full is more 
original. In the text the older general gives advice on how to conduct oneself in a ruling 
position. Abdallāh is now God’s shepherd over many people, and he must maintain order 
through punishment but also protect ordinary people, preserve them from bloodshed, keep the 
roads safe for them and create peaceful conditions for their daily work.246 Them follows some 
interesting passages on economic affairs: 
Know that wealth which is accumulated and then stored away in treasuries bears no fruit; 
but when it is expended on the improvement of the conditions of subjects, on the 
provision of their just dues and on removing burdens from them, it thrives and multiplies. 
As a result, the common people derive benefit from it, the governors bask in reflected 
glory from it, the whole age is made bright by it, and strength and defensive power are 
consolidated through it. Consequently, let the accumulated wealth of your treasuries be 
expended on making the world of Islam and its populace more prosperous.247 
 
This seems to be taken out of modern Keynesian economics – let state money circulate and 
society will prosper. Ṭāhir goes on to the moral – and with a modern expression: social 
psychological – aspects of dealing with public financial affairs: 
For know that if you are avaricious, you will want to grab everything and give nothing. If 
you behave thus, your rule will not go right for very long. Your subjects will only have 
confidence in your benevolence in as much as you refrain from arbitrary exactions on 
their wealth and avoid tyrannizing over them, and your subordinates will only remain 
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sincerely devoted to your interests as long as you give them adequate allowances and 
good pay.248 
 
Another passage that has attracted much attention deals with the land tax that was an 
important means of income for the Islamic state system: 
Look carefully into this matter of the land-tax, which the subjects have the obligation to 
pay. God has made this a source of strength and might for Islam, and a means of support 
and protection for His people; but He has made it a source of chagrin and vexation for His 
enemies and the enemies of the Muslims, and for the unbelievers in treaty relationship 
with the Muslims a source of abasement and humiliation.249 
 
The “unbelievers in treaty relationship” are the “protected peoples” or Dhimmīs – the Jewish 
and Christian peoples of the lands conquered by the Muslims.250 There were degrees of tax 
levels in the Islamic state, where Muslims were taxed lighter than other groups, the “people of 
the Book” – Jews and Christians – paid more, but were regarded as closer to the Islamic faith 
than other subjects who did not adhere the Abrahamic religions; these people were taxed the 
harshest. 
Still, according to Ṭāhir, it is important to “[…] Impose taxation on all the people in an 
equitable manner, for that is more likely to attach them to your interests and more certain to 
make the masses contented.”251 A few pages further out in the text of Ṭāhir’s epistle, he 
emphasizes the importance of taking care of the poor and destitute of society. There follows a 
series of arguments on this topic, and it has been described as a “welfare-aspect” to the duties 
of the ruler.252 
All in all, Ṭāhir’s text is an impressive list of the ideals a ruler should aspire to. That it 
resonated with sentiments of the time, is apparent from how it was received by 
contemporaries. When the caliph al-Maʾmūn read it, he exclaimed: 
[…] has not mentioned anything of the matters concerning the faith, the present world, 
the conduct of public affairs, judgment, statecraft, the improvement of the realm and of 
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the subjects, the safeguarding of the Muslim community, obedience to the Caliphs and 
maintenance of the caliphate, without in fact dealing with them thoroughly, making 
recommendations about them and giving instructions [for their execution].253 
 
The caliph then orders that the epistle should be copied out and sent to all the governors in the 
various districts.254 
The ruler is here shown to be a benevolent despot. “[…] a strong but gentle tyranny brings 
benefits to ruler and subject alike.”255 What the text fails to reveal is that a large part of the 
population ruled over by the caliphs was Christian. The ideals are mostly about how a Muslim 
ruler should behave towards his Muslim subjects, and no mention is made for any need to 
convert non-Muslims to Islam. Ṭāhir’s text has been called “aspirational” – in it the Muslim 
community is imagined to be at peace both with itself and its neighbors, which was far from 
actual reality.256 
Modern historians point out that the Arab wars of conquest “had created an enormous 
economic space in which long-distance commerce could unfold.”257 Even if it was not 
necessarily a strategic aim of the Arabs, the Islamic empire’s geographical location was ideal 
for intercontinental trade. Byzantine and Persian trading zones were now joined in a single 
commercial area. The Muslims were culturally and religiously well disposed towards 
commerce; the pre-Islamic society in the Arabian peninsula and areas bordering on the 
Byzantine and Persian empires had long benefited from extracting tariffs on trade caravans 
passing through their territories. 258 The chances for personal initiative were good, but it was 
not the Arabs in general who did this. They were content with living off the booty taken and 
later from state pensions. It was people in the conquered areas in the Islamic empire who took 
advantage of the new opportunities to make fortunes in trade and commerce.259 
These modern conceptions must be inferred in al-Ţabarī, he does not write about them 
explicitly. As we have seen, we get some indications of what economic ideals look like in al-
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Ţabarī’s world. And yet it is hard to find more than anecdotal episodes that illuminates what 
economic power meant. Al-Ţabarī is more interested in individuals that institutions. 260 There 
are anecdotes about how rulers receive or hand out large amounts of money, who controls 
monies and valuables, but little else. The following episodes in Al-Ţabarī can illustrate the 
general principle in his text. 
We have already seen the caliph al-Saffāh holding a sermon to the people of Kūfah, where he 
claims the caliphate on behalf of the ‘Abbasid family. In addition to the dynastic claim, he 
puts forward a series of statements on the Abbasid’s position in the Islamic society. The 
‘Abbasids are specified as kin of God’s Messenger.261 This gives them the right to “Whatever 
spoils God has given His Messenger from the people of the towns is for God and for the 
Messenger, and the near kinsman, and orphans.”262 This line of arguments continues: “[…] he 
has bestowed upon us our share of the booty and the spoils in kindness toward us an in favor 
to us. God is the Lord of mighty favor”.263 
This claim made in Kūfah legitimizes the ‘Abbasid rule in a religious sense; at the same time, 
it establishes their right to whatever booty and spoils that derive from the Muslim conquests. 
In this way, the right to control and distribute the wealth of the Muslim empire rests with the 
‘Abbasids. A very material basis for popularity indeed: one would do well to stay on the 
‘Abbasids’ good side, because the Caliphs’ control over the material resources in the Muslim 
empire. This way of organizing wealth is an important aspect of the Islamic world. The spoils 
of conquest were controlled from the top of the social strata: Muslim leaders did not distribute 
land to their fellow Arabs conquerors. Instead, taxes were collected by centrally appointed 
governors, and then distributed to the military forces.264 Stipends to soldiers and officers were 
thus of crucial importance, since this was what paid for the upkeep of the soldiers. The 
Islamic military leadership did not have estates to fall back on, as the military aristocracy of 
western Europe did.265 But such control was a double-edged sword. Al-Ţabarī’s work is full 
of tales of how failure to pay the army could lead to either desertion or rebellion, perhaps 
both. Since the army thus depended directly on the state for its subsistence, the military had to 
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control the state apparatus to make sure it operated in their interest. In the first three centuries 
of Islam many of the political disputes originated in disputes over who should control military 
status.266 Caliphal economic power was in this way inextricably linked with control over the 
military resources of the empire. 
In using Mann’s economic category we see that there are descriptions of matters related to the 
economic affairs of the state, but not many reflections on economic policy. Theophanes 
religiously based condemnations and al-Ṭabarī’s short comments on monies handed out, and 
his long text on advice all point to the importance of the ruler for economic matters, but the 
comments are merely moral. Modern historians have to infer the realities behind these 
descriptions. 
Chapter 5 Conclusion: comparative similarities and differences 
From the above analysis, it should be clear that I have found both similarities and differences 
in how Theophanes and al-Ţabarī describe the power of various rulers.  
The use of Michael Mann’s theory of the four categories of social power has proved useful in 
the analysis of Theophanes and al-Ţabarī. The four categories can be used in systemizing the 
descriptions in both chronicles; at the same time we see that the ideological category is the 
dominant one. This too fits well with Mann’s concept of shifting emphasis between the 
categories over time and in different cultures. He also argues that ideology mattered the most 
during the period in which Theophanes and al-Ţabarī lived and wrote. 
Let me sum up what I found in light of the different main categories. 
In the Ideological category we have seen how Mann’s two means of ideological power, his 
“transcendent vision” of social authority and his “immanence” which reinforces a group’s 
normative solidarity and gives it common ritual and aesthetic practices. Both are relevant in 
Theophanes and al-Ţabarī. In my analysis we saw the failure of both emperor and caliph to 
secure the succession of their heirs, in spite of making heavy use of ideological power. No 
matter how meticulous the arrangements of ideological ritual, the harsh realities of real-life 
politics could overthrow an unpopular or incompetent emperor or caliph. At the same time, 
the fact that ideology is so important to both Theophanes and al-Ţabarī, shows that it mattered 
a great deal to their world-view. But even if ideology is crucial in both societies, the 
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Byzantine empire could draw on its centuries of traditions and the role of the capital 
Constantinople as a focal point for imperial ideology; the caliphs came later to the scene, and 
al-Ţabarī’s descriptions reveal a polity that struggled with defining a new ideology based on 
older traditions. The Islamic rulers also struggled with a different geographical situation, their 
ideological strong points were spread out over a large area, not concentrated in one place like 
Constantinople. We saw that well demonstrated in the next category, the political. 
In the Political category Mann’s view of political power consisting of two means is 
confirmed. Both his “territorial centralization” and his “geopolitical diplomacy” has proved to 
be useful terms. They define an important distinction between the Byzantine and the Islamic 
empires: the geographical differences of the two states. When so much ideological and 
political power in the Byzantine empire was concentrated in Constantinople, “everything” 
happened there. In addition to what the Byzantine elite thought about an emperor, the 
opinions of the ordinary citizens could also play an important role in the empire’s power 
struggles. The confines of the capital, one city, and its buildings and spaces provided a 
physical boundary to the political struggles. Both Theophanes and other Byzantine writers 
repeatedly report on the ideological and political role of the Great Palaca, the Hippodrome, 
and the Hagia Sophia. Especially the Hippodrome provided an important meeting point for 
emperor and populace. In the caliphate the situation was very different: the ideological foci 
points were spread out: from Damascus to Baghdad, from Khurasan to Kūfah and on to 
Mecca and Medina. Even if the elite and military leaders in the caliphate could, and did move 
over these vast distances, ordinary people seldom did. Whereas Theophanes again and again 
describe how the populace of Constantinople reacts to a rulers’ actions and behavior, in al-
Ţabarī it is only the siege of Baghdad in 812-13 that ordinary people play a role, and even in 
these descriptions they play a minor role compared to the military events. 
These differences in Theophanes and al-Ţabarī can perhaps confirmed by the long-term 
developments in the worlds they described. In the Byzantine example, extreme concentration 
in one city; in the Islamic example a wide dispersion of power in different geographical areas. 
The Byzantine empire shrank until only Constantinople remained in 1453, and finally gave in 
to the cannons of the Ottoman sultan Mehmed II.267 The caliphate fragmented into the many 
Islamic polities that have constituted the Muslim world since the ninth century. It was the last 
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polity to use the resources of Mesopotamia as basis for an empire, but after its demise, the real 
power in the Muslim world were based in Egypt, Iran, and later, Turkey.268 
In the Military category is important in Theophanes and al-Ţabarī. Both our historians report 
on military affairs. Theophanes in short descriptions, al-Ţabarī often in long passages with 
detailed scenes of various battles. Still, neither of them reflects much on tactical and strategic 
matters. The differences in them are caused more by the differences in length of the texts, and 
the temperaments of the authors. Whereas the short texts of Theophanes shows a disinterest in 
the minutiae of physical battle, al-Ţabarī sometimes reads like an action movie: he revels in 
descriptions of physical combat, yet it is hard to get any specific information that is 
interesting to a modern historian. Many of his scenes could be a description of ancient Greek 
battles or marauding Vikings. The overall impression is that power in war was crucial for a 
ruler – otherwise he would be toppled or killed. In that sense Mann’s category is important, 
but as we have seen, the details are lacking and have to be found in other sources than 
Theophanes and al-Ţabarī. 
In the Economic category we have seen how both Theophanes and al-Ţabarī write little on 
economic matters. In both their works the moral aspect of the rulers’ fiscal policy is what 
strikes a modern reader. As I have stated above, Theophanes’ text reflects that the emperors 
and their administrators did enact fiscal policy, but Theophanes is silent on this: it is his moral 
perspective that decides whether he condemns or praises. Al-Ţabarī is less judgmental, but he 
too reports from a moral perspective. This category of Mann’s is useful, but as the 
information is so scant, other sources than Theophanes and al-Ţabarī must be used to flesh out 
research on economic topics in the Byzantine and Islamic worlds of the time. 
As should be clear from this thesis, there were many similarities but also differences between 
the worlds of Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī. Seen from a modern reader’s view, though, the 
similarities are obvious. Speros Vryonis points out that there were striking similarities 
between the Byzantine and Islamic civilizations in the period A.D. 500-1500. In spite of 
religious and linguistic differences, political enmity and almost a millennium of fierce 
combat, the two cultures shared much too: “[…] the relations of the citizen to God, to the 
state, to his fellow citizen, to the exploitation of the soil and the sea, and even in those highly 
particular manifestations of man’s soul and mind which we usually describe as cultural or 
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intellectual endeavor”, in all these areas of human life the similarities are obvious. The 
common culture and history that were provided by Hellenism after the time of Alexander the 
Great’s conquests, based on a fusion of Graeco-Roman, Iranian, Semitic, and Egyptian 
traditions, led to societies that on the surface may seem different, but which in reality shared 
much.269 Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī are valuable sources in showing these common traits. 
This thesis has shown that Mann’s theory can be applied to a more fine-masked categorization 
of sources such as Theophanes and al-Ṭabarī. Possibly these more detailed categories can be 
applied to other primary sources in the future. 
 
Appendix A 
Theophanes – extracts 
717-741 Leo III (the Isaurian) 
Breaks his promises: Leo III succeeds Theodosius III through an agreement that is arranged 
by the patriarch Germanus. Leo promises immunity to the emperor Theodosius, who resigns; 
Theodosius and his son become clergymen and spend the remainder of their lives in peace. 
Leo also promises to preserve the Church undisturbed (ref. the theological dispute over 
Iconoclasm in the Byzantine empire), but a becomes clear below, this is a promise he 
breaks.270 
Bad omens/religious failing: Leo’s infant son, the future emperor Constantine V is baptized 
in Hagia Sophia, and defecates in the baptismal font.271 The patriarch Germanus declares 
prophetically that this sign denotes that a great evil will befall the Christians and the Church 
on account of Constantine.272 
Legitimate succession: 554 Leo crowns Constantine, and so enhances his son claim to the 
throne.273 
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Breaks his promise: Leo initiates Iconoclasm, the ban on the veneration of icons, thus 
breaking his promise as referred to above.274 
Political/diplomatic failure: Iconoclasm is not accepted by the Pope in Rome, and the Pope 
reacts in two ways: he withholds the taxes of Italy, and he writes a doctrinal letter, which 
effectively curbs Leo’s influence on both secular and religious affairs in Italy.275 
Political failure: In Constantinople, the population is distressed over the ban on icons. There 
are violent protests against Leo’s pronouncements. The protests are met with “mutilation, 
lashes, banishment and fines, especially those who were prominent by birth and culture”. This 
leads schools and “pious” education to suffer.276 
Political/military success: The inhabitants of Hellas and the Cyclades revolt and appoint 
another emperor. Leo’s forces defeat the rebels outside Constantinople.277 
Iconoclast/Religious failure: In addition to forbidding icons, Leo criticizes the intercession 
of the “all-pure Theotokos”278 and all the saints: “[…] and he abominated their relics like his 
mentors, the Arabs”.279 
Iconoclast/Religious failure: The patriarch Germanus accuses Leo of reneging on his 
promise of not undermining the Church with respect to “her apostolic and God-given rites”. 
Leo is called the Antichrist. Leo plans on deposing the patriarch. The patriarch’s pupil and 
synkellos, Anastasios, supports Leo. Later, Anastasios will change theological views and 
support a rebellion against Constantine. This is prophesied, including Constantine’s later 
punishment of Anastasios.280 
Diplomatic failure: The Pope in Rome now “severed Rome and all of Italy from Leo’s 
dominion”.281 Leo convenes an illegitimate silentium against the icons. The patriarch refuses 
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to sign a condemnation of the icons and resigns. Leo appoints a “false” patriarch of 
Constantinople. The appointment is condemned by the Pope in Rome.282 
Military failure: Leo sends a great fleet against Rome and Italy, “under the command of 
Manes, strategos of Kibyraiots”: it is wrecked in a storm. 283  
Economic avarice: This failure makes Leo even more furious: he imposes a capitation tax on 
one third of the population of Sicily and Calabria; he orders a tax formerly paid to the 
churches to be paid to the Public Treasury.284 
General condemnation of Leo’ rule: Theophanes condemns Leo for all his faults. These 
have serious consequences: “The evils that befell the Christians at the time of the impious Leo 
both as regards the orthodox faith and civil administration, the latter in Sicily, Calabria, and 
Crete for reasons of dishonest gain and avarice; furthermore, the secession of Italy because of 
his evil doctrine, the earthquakes, famines, pestilences, and foreign insurrections.” Then 
follows a general and long condemnation of Leo’s son, the future Constantine V. All this then 
explains why many then take up the cause of Constantine’s brother-in-law, Artabasdos, who 
also lays claim to the throne: Artabasdos is orthodox.285 
 
741-743 Artabasdos (rival emperor at Constantinople) 
Orthodox: Iconodule 
Military and political failure: Fails in taking the throne – loses militarily to Constantine. 
 
741-775 Constantine V 
Iconoclast/Religious failure: Theophanes has already described Constantine, and here he 
continues the negative characterizations: “[…] Constantine became emperor by God’s 
judgement on account of the multitude of our sins”.286 
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Military and political challenge: Constantine’s brother-in-law, Artabasdos, rebels and takes 
Constantinople; he has the support of a lot of the people in the city. Constantine is initially 
unable to reconquer the capital and bides his time nearby. The Arabs use the civil war to 
plunder Byzantine areas.287 
Iconoclast/Religious failure: The patriarch, Anastasios, has switched sides. He now supports 
Artabasdos. The patriarch declares publicly that Constantine holds the wrong theological 
views. This makes the people curse Constantine.288 
Military and political challenge: “ln this year Oualid, Isam's son, became ruler of the Arabs. 
Both Constantine and Artabasdos sought his alliance by dispatching to him, the former the 
spatharios Andrew, the latter the logothete Gregory.”289 
Military and political success: Constantine retakes Constantinople; blinds Artabasdos and 
his two sons. Brutal: Constantine beheads, blinds, cuts of arms and legs of his enemies. He 
then scourges Anastasios and humiliates him in the Hippodrome.290 This way of punishing 
and humiliating opponents is repeated later: Constantine scourges and kills the monk Andrew 
in the Hippodrome; the body is saved from being thrown the Bosphorus by Andrew’s 
sister.291 
Bad omen/Religious failure/ Disfavored by God: A pestilence spreads in the Byzantine 
empire, and Theophanes blames the impious Constantine.292 
Legitimate succession: Constantine crowns his son, the future Leo IV ‘the Kazar’.293 
Iconoclast/Religious failure: Constantine convenes an illegal assembly, “against the icons”, 
of bishops; none of the universal sees are represented.294 
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Conscious ruler/economy: Because of the plague, Constantinople is depopulated; 
Constantine “brought families from the islands, Hellas, and the southern parts and made them 
dwell in the City so as to increase the population”.295 
Military failure: The Arabs invade “the Roman country” and take many prisoners. 
Constantine invades Bulgaria but is defeated in battle. He returns “ingloriously”.296 
Military success: Constantine goes to war against the Bulgarians again, and this time he wins 
a great victory; he celebrates “a triumph in the City”.297 
Bad omens/Religious failure: The winter is very cold, and thick ice covers both rivers and 
seas. When it breaks up, large icebergs fill the Bosporus and Theophanes describes how he as 
a boy played on one of them, and how a large iceberg struck the city walls with great force. 
Stars are seen falling from the heaven all at once, and observers believe it is the end of the 
world; a great drought sets in. The emperor summons the patriarch and asks: “’What harm is 
there if we call the Mother of God Mother of Christ?’” This is met by horror by the patriarch: 
“The other embraced him and said: ‘Have mercy, Ο lord! May not this statement come even 
to your mind. Don't you see how much Nestorios is held up to public scorn and anathematized 
by the whole Church?’ The emperor replied: ‘I have asked you for my own information. Keep 
it to yourself.’”298 
Brutal/religious persecution: Constantine commands that Stephen, a recluse at St. 
Auxentios, should be dragged in the street. He is then “broken apart”; his remains thrown in a 
ditch for executed criminals. The reason for this punishment is that Stephen has “[…] 
admonished many people to enter the monastic life and had persuaded them to scorn imperial 
dignities and moneys”. Constantine inflicts various “punishments and cruel tortures” on 
officers and soldiers who worship icons. Constantine forces the patriarch to mount the ambo 
and forswear the veneration of icons; he forces the patriarch to assume clerical tonsure and eat 
meat and put up with cither music at the imperial table. Constantine dishonors monks and 
nuns in the Hippodrome. He kills many dignitaries and whips others.299 
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Constantine is described as worse against Christians than the caliph; the relic of “the all-
praised” martyr Euphemia and her cask is thrown into the sea Theophanes writes that it will 
reappear under the reign of the future, orthodox, empress Irene and her son, the future 
emperor Constantine VI. But Constantine (V) is not content with getting rid of the martyr’s 
remains and casket, he also turns her church into “an arms-store and a dungheap”.300 
Conscious ruler: Constantine restores the aqueduct of Valentinian: “When the work had thus 
been completed, water flowed into the City.”301 
Brutal/religious persecution: Constantine humiliates “the false patriarch” Constantine, both 
in Hagia Sophia and in the Hippodrome; then beheads him and hangs his head at the Milion. 
Constantine sends men to remove “the celebrated stylite Peter from his rock”, he is then 
dragged alive through Constantinople’s main street and then thrown in the pit for executed 
criminals outside the city. Other opponents of the emperor’s views fare no better: “Others he 
tied up in sacks which he weighted with stones and commanded to be cast in the sea, and he 
went on blinding, amputating noses, scourging, and inventing every kind of torment for the 
pious.”302 
Economy/Avarice: Constantine is merciless toward monks and monasteries: “As for 
monasteries built to the glory of God and as a refuge to those seeking salvation, he turned 
them into common barracks for the soldiers who shared his opinions. […] as well as other 
holy habitations of monks and virgins he completely demolished:”303 
Immoral/Depraved: Constantine himself “delighted in music and banquets and educated his 
courtiers by means of foul language and dancing”. Constantine is supposed to have engaged 
in homosexual activities: “[…] after he had befriended Strategios, the (brother) of 
Podopagouros, who was of attractive appearance (for he liked to have such intimates for the 
sake of his lewdness), but becoming aware that this man was repelled by his illicit 
homosexuality and was confessing it to the blessed Stephen (the hermit of St Auxentios) and 
receiving salutary treatment, he branded him as a traitor and killed him along with the hermit 
as has been said above.” 304 
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Economy/Avarice: Constantine “also at this time made commodities cheap in the City. For, 
like a new Midas, he stored away the gold and denuded the peasants who, because of the 
exaction of taxes, were forced to sell God's bounty at a low price.”305 
Popular/Generous: During a ceremony at Hagia Sophia, Constantine throws gold coins to 
the crowd outside the church.306 
Legitimate succession: Constantine’s son Leo is betrothed to Irene; later Irene is crowned 
empress, and the pair is married.307 Soon after Irene and Leo have a son, the future 
Constantine VI.308 
Brutal/religious persecution: One of the empire’s regional officials enacts a terrible 
treatment of monasteries, monks and nuns: He “sold off all the male and female monasteries, 
all their holy vessels, books, and animals, and all their other possessions and paid their value 
to the emperor. Whatever books he found containing stories of monks and fathers of the 
desert he burnt. And whenever it appeared that anyone had a saint's relic as a phylactery, this, 
too, was consigned to the fire, while its possessor was punished for impiety. Many monks he 
killed by scourging, some by the sword, and a numberless multitude he blinded. In the case of 
some he smeared their chins with liquid wax and set fire to them so that their faces and heads 
were burnt, while others he subjected to many torments and then exiled. All in all, he did not 
leave in the whole thema that was under his authority a single man wearing the monastic 
habit.” The emperor approves wholeheartedly of these actions.309 
Military success and failure: Constantine is victorious against the Bulgars.310 The next 
campaign is a disaster. A large fleet is destroyed by a storm; the emperor returns to 
Constantinople without having gained anything. And then, to make the failure complete, the 
emperor’s own indiscretion reveals the Byzantine spies in the Bulgarian khan’s service. The 
spies are executed by the Bulgarians.311 Yet another attempt to attack the Bulgaria is initiated, 
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but this time Constantine is struck down by disease during the campaign. He dies trying to get 
back to Constantinople.312 
 
775-780 Leo IV the Khazar 
Popular/Generous: He lays his hands on the money left to him by his father and wins favor 
with the people and the notables.313 
Iconophile/Orthodox: (for a while) Initially he appears to be pious and a friend to the “holy 
Mother of God and of the monks”.314 
Popular/Legitimate succession: As a result of this, the commanders of the military districts 
set out and enters Constantinople “with a great throng of men to request that his son 
Constantine should be made emperor”. Leo expresses concerns that his son is to young, just 
an infant: “’My son is an only child and I am afraid of doing so lest I suffer the fate of all men 
and, while he is an infant, you put him to death and appoint another.’” They all swear loyalty 
to Leo and his son, and soon after this is confirmed in a ceremony taking place in Hagia 
Sophia during Holy Saturday: “[…] and, after changing the altar-cloth according to imperial 
custom, he mounted the ambo with his son and the patriarch. All the people entered the 
church and deposited their written declarations on the holy table. The emperor addressed 
them as follows: “’Behold, brethren, I am fulfilling your request and granting you my son as 
emperor. Behold, you are receiving him from the Church and from Christ's hand.’” The next 
day, Easter Sunday, Leo crowns his son in the Hippodrome, in front of “all the people”. The 
emperor and his family, with many notables, then proceed to Hagia Sophia.315 
Military: Leo leads a successful campaign against the Arabs. Celebrates a triumph in 
Constantinople.316 The year after, the Arabs tries to attack back, but fail.317  The year after, the 
Arabs attack yet again, but nothing comes of this for either of the two sides.318 
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Avarice: Leo is inordinately addicted to precious stones and being “enamoured of the crown 
of the Great Church”, he wears the crown so much that he develops carbuncles on his head 
and dies.319 
 
780-790 Constantine VI the Blinded and his mother Irene the Athenian (regent) 
791-797 Constantine VI alone 
797-802 Irene alone 
The total number of pages that concerns Irene and her son, Constantine VI, is 29, which is 
considerable for Theophanes. As indicated in the list above, their reigns are usually divided 
into three, but here I consider Theophanes’ descriptions together. 
Irene: Orthodox/Iconophile: Theophanes praises the succession of the 10-year-old 
Constantine, with his mother as regent, in 780. Especially important is Irene’s reintroduction 
of the veneration of icons. 320 
Irene: Political control: A plot to overthrow Irene is thwarted.321 
Irene: Legitimate: Irene “went in public imperial procession together with her son and 
offered to the church the crown that had been removed by her husband, which she had further 
adorned with pearls.”322 
Irene: Brutal: Irene punishes opponents – scourges, tonsures, banishes and imprisons.323 
Irene: Orthodox: People can now speak freely.324 
Irene: Good omens: A coffin is found by the Long Walls of Thrace, bearing the inscription: 
“’Christ will be born of the Virgin Mary and I believe in Him. Ο sun, you will see me again in 
the reign of Constantine and Irene.’”325 
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Irene: Political/diplomatic success: Irene proposes to have her son Constantine married to 
Charlemagne the Great’s daughter Erythro. An agreement is reached.326 
Irene: Military success: She crushes a rebellion in Sicily.327 
Irene: Military failure: Military conflict with the Arabs result in a stalemate. This is in part 
because of internal conflicts in the Byzantine army.328 
Irene: Military success: Irene’s forces under the patrician and logothete Staurakios beat the 
Sklavininan tribes in Thessalonica and Hellas and the Peloponnese. In January, a victory is 
celebrated for Staurakios during the hippodrome games. In May Irene herself, with 
Constantine, leads a military expedition to Thrace; she orders the city of Beroia rebuilt and 
renames it Eirenoupolis.329 
Irene: Orthodox/religious/political leader: Irene’s initiates what will be known as the 
second Council of Nicaea.330 Irene wishes to bring unity to the Church over the question of 
icons. She does this in agreement with the Pope in Rome and the patriarchs in Antioch and 
Alexandria (the peace with the Arabs allowed for this). The council initially convenes in 
Constantinople but is interrupted by elements of the army who support iconoclasm.331 This 
stops the synod, but Irene later proceeds to expel these soldiers from the city, and then: “After 
forming her own army with officers who were obedient to her, in the month of May she once 
again sent messages to all parts inviting the bishops to present themselves at the city of 
Nicaea in Bithynia with a view to holding the synod there. All through the summer everyone 
gathered at Nicaea. As for the representatives from Rome and the East, she had not dismissed 
them, but had detained them.”332 The council is then held successfully: “And so God's Church 
found peace, even though the Enemy does not cease from sowing his tares among his own 
workmen; but God's Church when she is under attack always proves victorious.”333 
Irene: Diplomatic/military/political/(personal) failure: Irene breaks the contract with the 
Franks; she marries Constantine to “a girl from the Armeniac parts”. Constantine is strongly 
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against this but obeys his mother. Later Irene tries to ally with a former king Langobardic 
against Charlemagne, but this effort fails. In Thrace, the Byzantine army suffers defeat against 
the Bulgars.334 
Irene: Political (personal) failure: Irene is deceived by powerful men in Constantinople: 
Constantine has reached the age of 20, but “the Devil, grudging the emperor’s piety, inspired 
certain evil men to set the mother against her son and the son against his mother. They 
persuaded her that they had been informed through prophecies to the effect that ‘It is ordained 
by God that your son should not obtain the Empire, for it is yours, given to you by God.’ 
Deceived, like the woman she was, and being also ambitious, she was satisfied that things 
were indeed so, and did not perceive that those men had offered the above pretext because 
they wanted to administer the affairs of State.” One result of this is that Constantine is 
distressed: Staurakios, the patrician and logothete, seems to hold power. Constantine fails in 
trying to overthrow Staurakios. Irene arrests the emperor’s men, flogs Constantine and impose 
an oath on the army: “’As long as you are alive we shall not suffer your son to rule.’ Everyone 
swore those words and no one at all dared to object.”335 
Constantine: political success: Constantine manages to depose his mother; assumes the 
imperial throne; Irene is confined in the palace of Eleutherios.336 
Constantine: weak rule: Constantine proclaims Irene co-emperor again.337 
Constantine: military failure/political unrest: Constantine makes an expedition against the 
Bulgars. This is a total failure, and he flees back to Constantinople. The disaster has 
consequences: “When the tagmata had assembled in the City, they decided to bring the former 
Caesar Nikephoros out of retirement and make him emperor.” Constantine reacts violently 
and he “ordered that all the sons of his grandfather Constantine should be brought to St 
Mamas: he blinded Nikephoros and cut off the tongues of Christopher, Niketas, Anthimos, 
and Eudokimos. Along with them he blinded the aforementioned patrician Alexios, having 
been persuaded by the pleading of his mother and of Staurakios (the said patrician) that if he 
did not blind him they would elect him emperor.” 338 
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Constantine: Brutal: Constantine makes an expedition against the Armeniacs and captures 
many of them. He puts the leaders to death, others he punishes by fines and confiscation. A 
thousand men are taken to Constantinople: “He had their faces tattooed in ink with the words, 
‘Armeniac plotter’. He then dispersed them in Sicily and the other islands.”339 
Theological failure: Constantine forces his wife to become a nun; then “the emperor crowned 
the cubicularia Theodote as Augusta and betrothed himself to her illegally”. This leads to a 
conflict with the abbot of Sakkoudion and other influential monks. Irene supports the monks, 
in opposition to her own son.340 
Military failure: A campaign against the Arabs fail, supposedly because Irene’s supporters 
sabotaged the Byzantine military effort. Constantine returns to Constantinople.341 
Weak: A coup by Irene deposes Constantine. He is blinded by Irene’s supporters and dies 
from his wounds.342 
Irene: Diplomatic/political failure: no control in Italy: Pope Leo in Rome flees a rebellion 
in Rome. He seeks refuge with Charlemagne, king of the Franks, not Irene in Constantinople. 
Charlemagne restores Leo as pope in Rome. Later, Leo repays Charlemagne by crowning him 
“emperor of the Romans”.343 
Irene: Military failure: Irene fails in achieving peace with the Arabs: the regions Cappadocia 
and Galatia are devastated. Another Arab expedition is also successful in ravaging the eastern 
parts of the Byzantine empire.344 
Irene: Political/diplomatic success: Irene’s contact with the western part of the old empire is 
depicted as successful. Charlemagne and Pope Leo III send emissaries asking Irene to marry 
Charlemagne, according to Theophanes. “In this year, on 25 December, indiction 9, Karoulos, 
king of the Franks, was crowned by Pope Leo. He intended to make a naval expedition 
against Sicily, but changed his mind and decided instead to marry Irene. To this end he sent 
ambassadors the following year, indiction 10.”345 This will unite the eastern and the western 
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part of the Roman empire. Here Irene is portrayed as successful in diplomatic affairs of great 
magnitude, and if it had been up to her, she would have accepted the marriage proposal. 
Unfortunately, the patrician Aëtios has other plans, he is scheming to place his brother on the 
throne, and according to Theophanes he is able to check Irene in marrying Charlemagne. We 
see here a depiction of Irene as initially powerful, but in the end unable to establish a reunion 
of the empire. She is dependent on the patrician and eunuch Aëtius; she is overruled by him in 
important matters: especially in the marriage proposal from Charlemagne. Aëtius plans to put 
his own brother on the throne; so does another patrician, Staurakios. Irene is dethroned by 
Nikephoros. The ambassadors from Charlemagne are in the city and observe this.346 
Theological/role as empress/generous /politically weak: “On the Monday of holy Easter the 
empress processed from the church of the Holy Apostles, riding in a golden chariot drawn by 
four white horses and held by four patricians, namely Bardanes, strategos of the Thrakesians, 
Sisinnios, strategos of Thrace, Niketas, domestic of the Schools, and Constantine Boilas, and 
she distributed largess in abundance. In the month of May the empress fell ill to the point of 
death and the rivalry between the eunuchs was intensified.”347 
Economy/Generous: “In March of the 9th indiction the pious Irene remitted the civic taxes 
for the inhabitants of Byzantium and cancelled the so-called komerkia of Abydos and Hieron. 
She was greatly thanked for these and many other liberalities.”348 
 
802-811 Nikephoros I 
Illegitimate succession: Nikephoros rebels against Irene and deposes her; the people curse 
“the crowned and he who was crowning”. Bad omens: Many have ill forebodings. Even the 
weather becomes gloomy. Treacherous: Nikephoros simulates benignity towards Irene, gets 
her to not conceal any of the imperial treasure. Then he breaks his oath – exiles her to 
Prinkipos and later to Lesbos, where she dies. Nikephoros also breaks his oath to a pretender, 
Bardanios – has him blinded.349 
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Illegitimate succession: Nikephoros crowns his son, Staurakios, emperor, in the ambo in 
Hagia Sophia. Staurakios is “in all respects unsuitable for this office”.350 
Nikephoros is known to deceive men. “A peculiar trait of character”. He “had a faculty for 
women’s tears”.351 
Weak religious and political control: Monks in Constantinople disapprove of Nikephoros’ 
appointment of patriarch; Nikephoros cannot expel the monks – more than 700!352  
Military failure: Defeated by the Arabs in Phrygia: “He lost many men and was himself on 
the point of being captured, had not some of the bravest officers managed with difficulty to 
deliver him from danger.”353 
Nikephoros loses to the Arabs: he is frightened, perplexed and he despairs; he must accept a 
peace and he must pay tribute. Then Nikephoros breaks the treaty, with the result that Arab 
forces attacks again and wreak havoc on the Byzantines.354 
Military: A military expedition against the Bulgars achieves nothing, and Nikephoros returns 
in haste to Constantinople to avert a revolt by parts of the army and imperial officials: “When 
he had come to Adrianople, he became aware that a revolt against him was being planned by 
imperial officials and by the tagmata”. He punishes his opponents with scourging, exile, and 
confiscation.355 
Avarice: He settles “refugees and aliens” in Thrace, planning to extract “a considerable 
amount of gold by way of annual taxes – this man who did everything for the gold he loved 
and not for Christ”.356 
Brutal/depraved: Nikephoros picks a wife for his son; he forces her, although she is already 
betrothed and has lain with her fiancée many times. Nikephoros selects with her two maidens, 
who he openly violates on the wedding day.357 
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Religious and political failure: “Theodore, abbot of Studios, and his brother Joseph, the 
archbishop of Thessalonica, along with the recluse Platon and their other monks withdrew 
from communion with Nikephoros, the most holy patriarch, on account of the oikonomos 
Joseph who had unlawfully married Constantine and Theodote.” Nikephoros holds a synod 
against certain abbots, monks and the archbishop of Thessalonica; he then expels them from 
Constantinople.358 
Military failure: Nikephoros fails in a military campaign against the Bulgars. He also refuses 
a promise of immunity to officers who escaped the massacre.359 
Religious failure/liar: Nikephoros swears to the Imperial City that he has celebrated Easter in 
the court of the Bulgarian Kroummos.360 
Unpopular: Nikephoros tries to manipulate his soldiers – they violently protest at his tent. 
“[…] advancing to the imperial [tent], cast many insults and curses upon him, swearing that 
they could no longer suffer his infinite avarice and mischievous character”. Brutal/not to be 
trusted: “While the army was on its way back, he pretended to be about to pay them, but 
instead punished most of them at St Mamas by lashes, tonsure, and exile, and the rest he 
conveyed to Chrysopolis having transgressed his terrible oaths. On account of their 
misfortune they called the Bosporus the ‘river of fire’.”361 
Economy/brutal: Nikephoros institutes a series of taxes, which affect the whole empire. 
Theophanes describes these actions “[…] in order to indicate this man’s inventiveness in all 
manner of greed. […] In this year Nikephoros extended his designs against the Christians by 
way of an ungodly control over the purchase of all kinds of animals, cattle and produce, the 
unjust confiscations and fines imposed upon prominent persons, and the exaction of interest 
on ships (he who issued laws against usury!) and a thousand other evil inventions. To describe 
all of them in detail would appear tedious to those who seek to learn events in a succinct 
form.”362 
Bad omen: A “man of lowly station”, dressed as a monk, tries to kill Nikephoros. Heretic: 
“The emperor was an ardent friend of the Manichees (now called Paulicians) and of his close 
 
358 Theophanes 1997: p. 665 
359 Theophanes 1997: pp. 665-66 
360 Theophanes 1997: p. 666 
361 Theophanes 1997: p. 666 
362 Theophanes 1997: pp. 667-71 






neighbours, the Athinganoi of Phrygia and Lykaonia, and delighted in their prophecies and 
rites.” Nikephoros uses their magic in defeating a rebellious patrician. Heretic/brutal: “He 
commanded military officers to treat bishops and clergymen like slaves, to lodge high-
handedly in episcopal residences and monasteries and abuse their goods.” Greedy/unjust: 
“Uncorrected by so many presages, the new Ahab, who was more insatiable than Phalaris or 
Midas, took up arms against the Bulgarians along with his son Staurakios.”363 
Military loss: Nikephoros attacks the Bulgarians; raises taxes; forces people to fight with 
slings and sticks; the disastrous rising of the Dog-star; orders animals, 15 infants and persons 
of all ages to be slain; then takes the “court” of Kroummos; finally, Nikephoros loses and is 
killed; so are many of his soldiers. Humiliated: Kroummos uses his skull to drink from.364 
Negative characteristics: “His slaying a consolation to many people […] his effeminate 
servants (with whom he went to bed) […] He surpassed all his predecessors by his greed, his 
licentiousness, his barbaric cruelty.”365 
 
811-811 Staurakios 
Unlucky: Staurakios participates in his father’s attack on the Bulgars; he is mortally wounded 
in battle. He has his father’s implacable character and is alienated from his sister Prokopia 
“for plotting against him at the instigation of the Augusta Theophano; for the unhappy 
woman, who was childless, was hoping to obtain the Empire straight away in the manner of 
the blessed Irene”.366 
Political failure: Staurakios tries to secure the empire for his wife, but he fails in this. He also 
fails in removing his brother-in-law, Michael. Michael becomes emperor.367 
Forced to abdicate: Staurakios does not accept Michael as emperor but has no choice. 
“Having heard of his proclamation, Staurakios immediately cut off his hair and put on 
monastic garb through the offices of his relative, the monk Symeon, all the time calling for 
the patriarch. The latter came to the palace together with the emperor Michael and Staurakios' 
sister and fervently begged Staurakios not to be grieved by the turn of events, which was due 
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not to a plot, but to despair concerning his life. Still raging with his father's wickedness, 
Staurakios did not acquiesce […]” Soon after he dies of his wound.368 
 
811-813 Michael I Rangabe 
Promises to keep his hands unsullied … 
Legitimate: Michael is proclaimed emperor by the entire Senate and the tagmata in the 
Hippodrome. He is then crowned in the ambo in Hagia Sophia. Generous: Michael donates 
gold to the patriarch and the clergy. He is magnanimous and liberal. He donates gifts to the 
Senate and the army. Orthodox: Michael is “pious and highly orthodox”.369 
Diplomatic success: Michael sends an embassy to Charlemagne: for a peace treaty and a 
marriage contract for his son Theophylaktos. The patriarch sends a synodic letter to the Pope 
(he has previously been prevented by Nikephoros in doing this).370 
Legitimate succession: Michael crowns his son, Theophylaktos, by the hand of the patriarch 
in the ambo of Hagia Sophia.371 
Generous: “He offered a sumptuous adornment for the holy sanctuary, namely golden vessels 
set with stones and a set of four curtains of ancient manufacture, splendidly embroidered in 
gold and purple and decorated with wonderful sacred images. He also donated 25 lbs. of gold 
to the patriarch and 100 lbs. to the venerable clergy, so adorning the holy feast and his son’s 
proclamation.”372 
Theological dispute: Michael decrees the death penalty against the Paulicians and Athinganoi 
in Phrygia but is then turned back from this course by “certain perverse counsellors”. Both 
sides argue from theological positions. Michael executes some of the heretics, but the matter 
is unsettled.373 
Military failure: Campaigning against the Bulgarians, Michael is less than successful: “evil 
and perverse” counsellors cause sedition and unrest in the army; the Bulgarians extends their 
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power over Thrace and Macedonia. The populations that had been forcibly resettled by 
Nikephoros, flees, and return to their former homes.374 
Renewed conflict with the Bulgarians, who invade Byzantine territory. Michael wants to 
make a peace agreement, but his councilors reject this. Then, when Michael again sets out 
against the Bulgarians, the iconoclasts again revolt in Constantinople.375 
Political and theological conflict: In Constantinople opponents of Michael, take up arms to 
“subvert the orthodox faith”. They call for iconoclasm, as in the days of Constantine V: he at 
least, was successful against the Bulgarians. Michael manages to quell this revolt. Even 
though the insurgents are arrested, the admiration for Constantine V and iconoclasm is a large 
problem for Michael.376 
Military failure/abdication: Again, Michael is bested by the Bulgarians and has to flee back 
to Constantinople. “As for the emperor, he was making his homeward escape, cursing the 
army and its commanders and swearing he would abdicate the Empire. […]377 
When the strategoi and the army had learnt that the emperor had fled to the City, they 
despaired of being ruled by him any longer and, having taken counsel among themselves, 
implored (the patrician) Leo, strategos of the Anatolics, to help the common cause and protect 
the Christian state.” Michael wants to abdicate his rule, and even though he initially is 
prevented in doing this by the patriarch, he finally does so when the strategos Leo consents to 
becoming emperor. “On being informed of his proclamation, Michael, together with Prokopia 
and their children, sought refuge in the chapel of the Pharos, where they cut off their hair and 
donned monastic garb […].” The Bulgarians invade all the way to Constantinople and plunder 
the suburbs, before returning home.378 
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Tabari - extracts 
749-754 Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Saffāh Volume 27/28 
Al-Saffāh was the first of the Abbasid caliphs, and his claim to rule over the Islamic world 
was based on lineage: according to the Abbasids, their family ties to the Prophet Muhammad 
made them the rightful heirs to rulership over all Muslims. 
Legitimate: Genealogy: Al-Saffāh is a descendant of the Prophet’s uncle. He asserts this 
claim in a sermon from the minbar/mosque in Kūfah. The ‘Abbasid rebellion is a return to 
rightful rule; the people have been wronged by the Umayyads. Al-Saffāh receives “the 
handclasp of allegiance”.379 
Controlling wealth: In a sermon to the people of Kufah: Even though the Muslims position 
as the “kin of God’s Messenger”, is privileged, the Abbasid position is even more exalted: 
“Know that if you take anything as booty, one fifth of it is for God and for the Messenger and 
for the near kinsmen and for orphans.”   
“People of Kufah, you are the halting-place of our love, the lodging of our affections. You it 
is who remained steadfast, you who were not deflected from our love by the injustice of the 
people of tyranny against you until you reached our epoch and God brought you our 
revolution. You of all mankind are most fortunate in us and most worthy of our generosity. 
We have increased your allowances to a hundred dirhams. Make ready, then; for I am the 
manifest Spiller (Saffāh), the desolating Avenger.” Al-Saffāh controls the booty and spoils in 
the Islamic empire.380 
Pious: Al-Saffāh will rule according to what God has sent down and in accordance with the 
Book of God.381 
Orthodox: Again, in Kufah: Al-Saffāh claims descent from Muhammad.382 
Weak ruler: The people of the Jazirah “put on white” and throw off the allegiance to al-
Saffāh.383 The conflict between Al-Saffāh and his general Abū Muslim: the general 
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supposedly “does just what he pleases”.384 This passage shows al-Saffāh’s weakness – he 
does not dare to confront Abū Muslim, whose large army is loyal to Abū Muslim, not the 
caliph.385 
 
754-775 Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr Volume 28/29 
In this part of the chronicle, al-Ţabarī describes administrative detail, government 
appointments, the travels of the caliph, the foundation of Baghdad and al-Manṣūr’s conflict 
with his nephew, Ῑsā b. Mūsā, who has a claim to the caliphate. Al-Manṣūr wants his own son, 
al-Mahdī to be designated as the next caliph, contrary to an arrangement made by al-Saffāh 
earlier. Eventually, Ῑsā b. Mūsā is bought off for the time being. He agrees to wait in 
succession till after al-Mahdī’s reign. This process is described in narrative and dialogue by 
al-Ţabarī.386 
Legitimate: Genealogy: Before he dies, al-Saffāh has the oath taken to his brother, al-
Manṣūr. Another brother, ʿῙsā b. Mūsā, gets it as al-Manṣūr’s successor. “The Caliph recorded 
the deed of these appointments in a document, placed it in a container, sealed it with his own 
seal and the seals of his family, and entrusted it to 'Isa b. Musa.”387 
 
Personal weakness/military weakness: Al-Manṣūr is very uneasy about his position when 
he becomes caliph. He fears two possible opponents: 
1. His uncle, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī, who also has a claim to the caliphate. Al-Manṣūr needs Abū 
Muslim to calm him down by promising to deal with ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī – the caliph does not 
have military control but is reliant on Abū Muslim’s generalship. (The general defeats 
ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī at Nisibin – he lives thereafter under house arrest.)388 
2. Those loyal to Alī b. Ţalīb and his descendants, the rival claimants to a valid dynastic 
succession from the Prophet Muhammad – this is the faction (The House of Alī) in the 
Islamic world that eventually will become the Shia. Al-Manṣūr’s inability to deal with an 
actual Alid revolt, led by Muḥammad and Ibrāhīm, the sons of ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥasan. The 
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problem and challenge are described as serious. It is al-Manṣūr’s cousin, ʿῙsā b. Mūsā who 
finally defeats the two brothers. But then, there is the story of all the Alids al-Manṣūr killed 
and hid in a vault in his palace.389 
Brave, but not a military leader: Al-Manṣūr is described as a “lion” in battle. But he seems 
not to have led an army himself.390 
Political weakness: The people give the oath of allegiance, but ʿῙsā b. Mūsā also gets it, as al-
Manṣūr’s successor; al-Manṣūr becomes caliph, but he does not have the power to nominate 
his own successor 391; Eventually, he manages to buy/force ʿῙsā b. Mūsā to give up the claim, 
and al-Manṣūr’s son, al-Mahdī, is named successor. He was a good administrator. 392 
Political/military weakness: Al-Manṣūr kills Abū Muslim. This event shows how weak al-
Manṣūr’s position is – he has to hide the dead body in a carpet and throw it in the Tigris river! 
Later in life al-Manṣūr will muse on the three mistakes he made as caliph, and which almost 
cost him the caliphate/his life. The killing of Abū Muslim is one of them, even though the 
gamble paid off.393 
Benevolent/pious: Al-Manṣūr enlarges the Mosque in Mecca; this is “the Year of 
Abundance”.394 
Piety: Al-Manṣūr goes on the Pilgrimage, entering the “state of consecration”. In other years 
he leads the Pilgrimage. 395 He is described as praying intensely on the prayer mat (fear?). Al-
Manṣūr is abstaining from women.396 Entertainment was never seen in al-Mansur’s house.397 
Humble/self-reflection: Al-Manṣūr’s recognition of three mistakes; “I have made three 
mistakes from whose evil consequences God has protected me.”398 
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Magnanimous: Al-Manṣūr forgives offense; he is generous with money and appointments to 
governorships.399 
Cunning: He shows cunning in sending out spies against his enemies.400 
Angry: Al-Manṣūr is mad with anger.401 He expresses rage and cruelty.402 A poem laments 
the brutality of al-Manṣūr.403 Al-Manṣūr orders a man to be buried alive.404 There are other 
descriptions of al-Manṣūr’s cruelty.405 
Shifting appearances/personality: Al-Manṣūr is describes as good-natured in private vs 
gloomy/mad in public.406 
Magic: Al-Manṣūr uses a magic mirror to search for his opponent, Muḥammad.407  
Use of astrologer: Al-Manṣūr seeks assurances of victory with an astrologer. Al-Manṣūr uses 
a group of astrologers and mathematicians in the planning of Baghdad.408 
Impious: Muḥammad accuses al-Manṣūr of building the Green Dome in Baghdad to compete 
with the Ka ͑ bah.409 
Avoiding a sworn contract: A legal scholar is asked by one of al-Manṣūr’s opponents about 
the oath sworn to the caliph. The answer is the following: “’You gave the oath of allegiance 
only under compulsion. A sworn contract is not incumbent upon anyone who has been 
coerced.’”410 
Debatable legitimacy: Letters between al-Manṣūr and Muḥammad, debating legitimacy. The 
caliph does not recognize kinship through women (Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter).411 
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Stinginess: Al-Manṣūr is not paying the troops. He is generally known for his stinginess, and 
this reputation earns him the nickname “Father of small coins/pennies”.412 
Building Baghdad: The new city is built because of a need for political and military control 
(away from the supporters of the Umayyads in Syria). In addition, there is a need to impress 
the population in the Islamic world and the Byzantines.413 
Devious/evil: Al-Manṣūr tries to trick ʿῙsā b. Mūsā into killing an important person. This 
would make ʿῙsā b. Mūsā unpopular in the family, but ʿῙsā b. Mūsā refuses to do it.414 
Wise: Al-Manṣūr speaks words of wisdom: “Do not settle a matter without thinking about it, 
for the thought of the intelligent man is his mirror in which he sees his good and his evil.”415 
Lacking religious authority: Al-Manṣūr needs to seek legal advice on marriage contract with 
faqihs.416 
Asserting religious authority: Al-Manṣūr holds a sermon in Baghdad.417 
 
775-785 Al-Mahdī Volume 29 
The conflict over al-Mahdī’s succession has been described in the part on his father, al-
Manṣūr’s, reign. In this part of the chronicle, two elements are of interest: The first is a 
description of signs of rulership: The staff of the Prophet and the Prophet’s mantle, and 
the seal of the caliphate.418  
His bad Arabic: During a pilgrimage to Mecca with his father, al-Mahdī speaks but it is 
commented to his father that: “Commander of the Faithful, will you put this fellow in the 
hands of someone who could correct his speech? He speaks as carelessly as the slave girl!”419 
Generous: Generous with money.420 
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Weak, and easily influenced by his wife: Al-Mahdī is influenced by his wife, Khayzuran.421 
Later by the “freedmen”.422 
Conflict over legitimacy: Al-Mahdī’s cousin ʿῙsā b. Mūsā gives in and receives an enormous 
sum of money to renounce his right to the caliphate in favor of al-Mahdī’s son, al-Hādī.423 
Pious: Al-Mahdī improves and restores the Ka’bah and “the Mosque of the Prophet of God” 
in Mecca.424 
Dissolute and licentious: Al-Mahdī is described as dissolute and licentious.425 
 
785-786 Mūsā al-Hādī Volume 30 
Politically Weak: The army demands payment and eventually gets it.426 
Weak: Al-Hādī’s brother, Hārūn al-Rashīd, is the one who takes control of Baghdad; Hārūn 
then takes the oath on al-Hādī’s behalf as caliph, and to himself (Hārūn) as successor to al-
Hādī.427 
Weak: Al-Hādī has a serious conflict with his mother. He forbids his men to see and petition 
her. She later has him killed.428 
Weak: Al-Hādī tries to get his own son confirmed as caliph, over Hārūn, but this fails.429 The 
vizier Yaḥyā convinces al-Hādī to let Hārūn be caliph first, then al-Hādī’s son can be the next 
successor.430 
Negligent of duties: Al-Hādī is not hearing petitions, as is expected of a good caliph.431 
Supposedly two persons: One in private, another in public.432 
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Harelip: “He used to have the nickname of “Mūsā, shut your mouth!”” Otherwise, he is 
described as a handsome man.433 
 
786-809 Hārūn al-Rashīd Volume 30 
Symbols/regalia: Here al-Ţabarī describes insignia of royalty: The Prophet’s cloak (burdah), 
the sword (sayf), and the parasol (mizallah); and the seal ring (khatam) and sceptre 
(qadib).434 Another important aspect of al-Rashīd’s reign for our purposes is his formalized 
arrangement with documents signed at Mecca and deposited in the Ka'bah. He does this to 
ensure the proper succession for three of his sons: al-Amīn, al-Maʾmūn and al-Qasīm.435 
Military: 29/212-213 When Hārūn is heir apparent, his father al-Hādī appoints him to lead a 
summer expedition against the Byzantines. Al-Hādī sends Yaḥyā b. Khālid b. Barmak with 
Hārūn: “He sent with him al-Ḥasan and Sulaymān, sons of Barmak, and he sent Yaḥyā b. 
Khālid with him in charge of the administration of the army, his expenses, his secretariat, and 
the managing of his affairs, and all Hārūn’s business was in his hands. Al-Rabī ͑ the 
Chamberlain was appointed with Hārūn to go on the raid on behalf of al-Mahdī, and (the 
differences) between al-Rabī ͑ and Yaḥyā were on account of that.”436 
Weak: Hārūn is initially reconciled to giving up succession rights; Yaḥyā convinces him 
otherwise.437 
Immature/weak: When Hārūn becomes caliph, he appoints Yaḥyā as vizier – gives him his 
seal ring; Khayzuran is consulted by Yaḥyā.438 
Generous with money. Khayzuran also: 30/102 Pilgrimage, performing it.439 
Improves in stature: Khayzuran dies. The matter of the seal ring (?).440 
Generous: Generous with money.441 
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Has God’s favor: The people of Syria approve of him.443 
Lacks political control: The people of Kufah rebels.444 
Dynastic control: Secures the succession of his three sons.445 
Weak: Needs legal backing in formal decisions, repudiates guarantee of safe conduct and 
needs a judge to confirm.446 
Weak: Safety in Baghdad.447 
Donations, poetry, literature, religious law448 30/305 
 
809-813 Muḥammad al-Amīn Volume 31 
The four- and one-half year of al-Amīn’s reign is dominated by the conflict and civil war 
between al-Amīn and his half-brother al-Maʾmūn. As we saw in the last section, their father, 
Hārūn al-Rashīd, tried to ensure an ordered succession among three of his sons. We will only 
follow this conflict through al-Amīn’s reign. What interest us in this section are three different 
descriptions. The first is a reference to the reviving of the Sunnah and sending for religiously 
learned men.449 This is important for how the status of the caliphs was perceived at this time. 
The second description is on how al-Amīn tears up the signed letters that his father 
deposited in Mecca.450 The third description concerns how displeased the present Governor 
of Mecca is by al-Amīn’s actions and denounces him.451 
Too young: Al-Amīn: his father secures oaths of allegiance when he is five years old. Al-
Amīn is hailed in a poem as nobly born.452 
 
442 Al-Ţabarī 1995: Vol. 30, p. 154 
443 Al-Ţabarī 1995: Vol. 30, p. 160 
444 Al-Ţabarī 1995: Vol. 30, p. 164 
445 Al-Ţabarī 1995: Vol. 30, pp. 183ff 
446 Al-Ţabarī 1995: Vol. 30, pp. 121ff 
447 Al-Ţabarī 1995: Vol. 30, pp. 356-7 
448 Al-Ţabarī 1995: Vol. 30, p. 305 
449 Al-Ţabarī 1992: Vol. 31, p. 17 
450 Al-Ţabarī 1992: Vol. 31, p. 27 
451 Al-Ţabarī 1992: Vol. 31, pp. 124ff 
452 Al-Ţabarī 1995: Vol. 30, pp. 111-12 






Asserting control: Upon getting the message about his father’s death, al-Amīn commands the 
people to be present at the Friday sermon. He leads them in worship, before ascending the 
pulpit.453 
Weak (?): Demanding loyalty and obedience from his brother, al-Mamun.454 Commanding 
his brother Salih’s return to Baghdad.455 
Weak: Reference to the reviving of the Sunnah by al-Mamun and sending for religiously 
learned men. At this time the power of the caliphs in religious matters were slipping (see 
Crone: God’s Caliphs).456 
Authority contested: Al-Mamun refuses to acknowledge Musa’s position.457 Al-Amīn tears 
up two letters in the Kabah, which confirms al-Maʾmūn’s son as heir.458 Letters between the 
brothers.459 Forbids prayers to al-Amīn and Qasim.460 
Generous: Gives money and fancy clothes to the army.461 
Heedless of signs (brave?): Disregards his astrologer and the moon.462 
Not too evil: He will not kill his two nephews.463 
Loses authority: The Governor of Mecca Casts off Allegiance to al-Amin.464 
Resented465 
Bad omens: The slave girl’s song; the breaking of the cup.466 
Frivolous: Al-Amīn is fond of eunuchs, entertainers, animals, parties, not close to his family 
etc.467 
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Ignominious death: During the conflict between the two brothers, al-Amīn and al-Maʾmūn, 
the forces of al-Maʾmūn besiege Baghdad. Al-Amīn tries to surrender to the general he knows 
but is eventually caught by another of al-Maʾmūn’s commanders and killed.468 
 
813-833 ‘Abdallāh b. Hārūn al-Maʾmūn Volume 32 
Succession - strong: With the death of al-Amīn, his brother al-Ma’mūn becomes sole ruler 
over the muslims, and “the people in the eastern lands, in Iraq and the Hijaz, came together 
and gave their obedience” to him.469 
 
Weak/small economic control: From Khurasan in the east, al-Ma’mūn writes to Ṭāhir al-
Husayn who controls Baghdad and orders him to “hand over the whole of the tax revenues in 
his possession, collected from all the provinces, to the representatives of al-Ḥasan b. Sahl 
[…]”, but “[…] Ṭāhir refused to hand over the land tax to ‘Alī until he had paid in full the 
army’s pay allowances. When he had fulfilled his obligations to them, he handed over the tax 
revenues to him.”470 
 
Economic control: Al-Ma’mūn seemingly has control: “The notable events taking place 
during this year included the arrival in Baghdad of al-Ḥasan b. Sahl, as al-Ma’mūn’s 
appointee with responsibility for both military and financial matters. 
When he reached the city, he divided up his tax collectors (‘ummāl) amongst the various 
districts and provinces.”471 
 
Politically weak: In these sections Tabari describes a series of insurrections and revolts, 
which all point to al-Ma’mūn’s lack of political, military, and religious control in the regions 
west of Khurasan.472 
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Political failure: The revolt of Muhammad b. Ibrāhīm. Important conflicts outside of al-
Ma’mūn’s control.473 
 
Religious/political failure: Al-Ma’mūn’s general, Harthamah tells the people he will lead the 
pilgrimage. He holds back pilgrims from various regions, awaiting a victory in Kufah. One of 
his opponents has other plans: “Abū al-Sarāyā sent representatives to Mecca and Madīnah 
who would take control there and take charge of the pilgrimage.”474 
 
Religious/political failure: The caliph does not have control in Mecca or Medina; various 
factions fight over control.475 
 
Religious failure: The ‘Alids take Mecca; The Ka’bah gets a new covering of silk; the 
Abbasids are condemned, and their covering thrown away, so that “the Holy House might be 
purified from [the profanation] of their covering.”476 Purging of Mecca: Abbasid followers are 
tortured, and their valuables are taken; the columns of the Sacred Mosque are stripped of their 
cold coverings, iron, and teak beams.477 Conflicts around Mecca.478 
 
Politically weak: Conflict with Harthamah. Harthamah claims to have acted in the best of al-
Ma’mūn’s interests in the west. Based om misinformation, al-Ma’mūn has him killed.479 
 
Politically weak: Manṣūr b. al-Mahdī accept the military command over Baghdad, from 
people who are dissatisfied with al-Ma’mūn.480 
 
Controlling succession: “Al-Ma’mūn Designates ‘Alī b. Mūsā as Heir to the Throne” in an 
attempt to heal the split between the Abbasid and the Alids.481 
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Controlling succession: Everyone is to swear allegiance to ‘Alī and “To wear green-sleeved 
coats, tall, pointed caps and other distinguishing features.”482 
 
Not controlling succession: Not everyone agrees to this. Especially members of the Abbasid 
family in Baghdad are angered. As a reaction to the caliph’s orders, the people of Baghdad 
instead give their allegiance to Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī. The members of the Abbasid family 
declare al-Ma’mūn deposed.483 
 
Succession/economy - weak: Al-Ma’mūn declares that green shall be the colors of the 
caliphate, not the traditional black of the Abbasids. This is met with resistance. In addition, he 
is forced by the army to pay them large sums of money. In general, in both the above and in 
the following sections: fighting and disputes over who should be caliph, and between the 
‘Abbasid and the ‘Alid supporters.484 
 
Succession/political - weak: In these sections, al-Ma’mūn seems to be unaware of important 
events. As a result, al-Ma’mūn decides to depart for Baghdad. 485 
 
Politically weak: Al-Ma’mūn’s conflict with his own family in Baghdad.486 
 
Succession/political - stronger: The people of Baghdad throw off allegiance to Ibrāhīm.487 
 
Succession/political control: Al-Ma’mūn takes control over Baghdad.488 
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Economic ideal: Al-Ma’mūn’s general, Ṭāhir’s advice to his son: On appointing his son to a 
military command, Ṭāhir sent him an epistle, containing advice on how to rule.490 The epistle 
has been described as an early example of the “Mirrors for Princes” genre in Arabic.491 Key 
concepts that Ṭāhir writes about: Devout/moderate/favorable attitude towards people – but not 
naïve/punish swiftly when necessary/keep agreements/make friends with serious people/shun 
evil thoughts and oppressive behavior/avoid hasty temper/royal authority belongs to God 
alone/do not be avaricious. 
 
Economic control: Al-Ma’mūn quells a rebellion in Yemen that is related to taxation.492 
 
Geography (Andalusia outside of the caliph’s control): This is a rare example of Tabari 
writing about events that has to do with Spain: The “activities of ‘Abdallah and the 
Andalusians” who come to Egypt from Andalusia in Spain.493 
 
Economic control: Al-Ma’mūn maintains the tax level in Qumm; he sends military forces to 
enforce the taxation.494 
 
Theological control: 32/176-77 The year 827-828: Al-Ma’mūn proclaims the doctrine of the 
createdness of the Qur’ān.495 
 
Military control: Al-Ma’mūn appoints his brother as governor of Syria and Egypt, and his 
son over the Jazirha, the frontier regions and the defensive fortresses.496 
 
Military control: Al-Ma’mūn leads a campaign against the Byzantines. He is victorious, but 
it all sounds more ritualistic than a real attack on the Byzantine Empire: “In this year, after 
leaving the land of the Byzantines, al- Ma'-mum set off for Damascus.”497 
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Political control: Al-Ma’mūn asserts control over a tyrannical governor.498 
 
Military/political/diplomatic control: Letters between the Byzantine emperor Theophilus 
and al-Ma’mūn.499 
Theological control/losing control: Al-Ma’mūn declares the createdness of the Quran. By 
doing this, he claims a role as a theological arbiter. But he faces strong opposition.500 
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